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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Economics of Rental Housing and Crime 
 
My dissertation consists of three chapters in the area of applied microeconomics. The first 
chapter exploits the mass evacuation of thousands of New Orleans residents to numerous 
counties throughout the South in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to identify the impact of 
migration on rents and estimate supply elasticities in local rental housing markets.  The second 
chapter follows with an investigation of the impact that the evacuations on crime in the 
destination counties.  The analyses in the first two chapters are conducted using data from 
American Community Survey and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting database.  The third chapter focuses on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and rental housing market outcomes.  This analysis employs panel data on 
individual senior housing properties from the National Investment Center for Seniors Housing 
and Care to measure ownership concentration and to examine its impact on senior housing rents 
and occupancy measures.  
 
The Impact of Migration on Rents: Evidence from Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coasts of Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, 
leaving in its wake damage of catastrophic proportions.  The mass evacuations before and after 
the hurricane led to the long-term displacement of more than half of the New Orleans residents to 
counties throughout the United States, but predominately in the South.  This study uses a panel 
of Southern counties constructed from American Community Survey (ACS) data to estimate the 
impact of Katrina migration on local rents.   Relying on the exogenous nature of this forced 
migration, this analysis finds that population changes due to Hurricane Katrina evacuations 
expanded the market demand for rental housing and consequently increased rents.  Specifically, 
an increase in Katrina migration equal to 1 percent of the county population resulted in a 3 to 8 
percent increase in the rents of natives. The study also suggests that the short-run rental housing 
supply is inelastic, with estimates ranging between 0 and 0.60.   
 
The Impact of Hurricane Katrina Migration on Crime 
The evacuations from Hurricane Katrina led to an influx of economically vulnerable people into 
numerous counties throughout the South This paper follows the empirical framework of the 
preceding chapter by exploiting the quasi-experimental nature of these evacuations to evaluate 
whether this mass migration had an impact on crime levels in the destination counties. The study 
uses a panel of Southern counties constructed of data extracted from American Community 
Survey (ACS) and the Federal Bureaus of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting database.   
The analysis finds that population changes due to Hurricane Katrina did not have a statistically 
significant impact on the total level of violent crimes or property crimes.    
 
The Impact of Market Concentration in the Market for Senior Rental Housing 
The senior housing rental market is one of the fastest growing housing segments, but relatively 
little is known about its market structure.  This paper uses panel data on individual senior 
housing properties from the National Investment Center for Seniors Housing and Care (NIC) to 
examine the impact of ownership concentration in the market for senior rental housing.  Market 
concentration is greatest in the independent living and assisted living senior housing markets.  In 
 
 
the assisted living market, in particular, increased concentration results in higher average 
monthly rents and lower occupancy, as would be predicted by standard microeconomic theory. 
In the independent living market increased concentration results in increased rent growth and 
lower occupancy.  Nonprofit providers appear to attenuate the impact of market concentration, 
especially in the independent living market.           
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Chapter 1 
The Impact of Migration on Rents: Evidence from Hurricane Katrina 
1.1 Introduction 
The price elasticity of housing supply is an important parameter in determining how 
demand factors, such as means-tested housing assistance programs and migration, impact rental 
market outcomes.  In general, receipt of housing choice vouchers or migration can cause an 
increase in the local market demand for rental housing. If the rental market has a relatively 
inelastic supply, however, this change may result in a substantial increase in the rental rate and a 
proportionally smaller increase in the quantity of available housing. Unfortunately, the existing 
literature on housing supply is narrow, and there are few reliable estimates of short-run price 
elasticity of supply (DiPasquale, 1999; Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo, 2005).  This paper exploits 
the mass evacuation of thousands of New Orleans residents to numerous counties throughout the 
South in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to identify the impact of migration on rents and 
estimate supply elasticities in local rental housing markets.   
Hurricane Katrina struck the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana Gulf Coasts on August 
29, 2005, and it departed as one of the five deadliest and the costliest hurricane in U.S. history.  
Approximately 300,000 homes were destroyed or severely damaged, and levee breaches 
following the storm caused more than 80 percent of the city of New Orleans to be covered in 15 
to 20 feet of water (U.S. Department of Homeland Security: White House Report, 2006).  The 
severity of the storm and deplorable conditions of makeshift evacuation centers in New Orleans 
led to the evacuation of more than 400,000 people to various cities and towns throughout the 
United States, primarily in the South.  In addition to the evacuees assisted by the government, 
those that voluntarily evacuated the Gulf Coast as a temporary measure prior to the storm soon 
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realized that they could not return home.  This facilitated a long-term and, in some cases, a 
permanent move for nearly half of New Orleans’ population (Plyer, 2015).   
This analysis uses the quasi-experimental nature of these forced evacuations from New 
Orleans as a measure of migration in various counties throughout Louisiana and in bordering 
states.  Data on household migration from New Orleans, and information on rents and additional 
covariates in evacuee destination counties are extracted from the American Community Survey 
(ACS) data set.  The annual ACS asks respondents whether or not they are renters, the amounts 
of their monthly contract and gross rents, their migration status and city of residence one year 
before the survey date.  Using the 2005-2007 cohorts, data are aggregated by household and then 
by county to develop a panel of 39 counties in Louisiana and the bordering states of Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Texas.  Fixed effects and weighted least squares regressions are employed to infer 
a causal relationship between migration and rents and rental housing supply elasticity estimates.   
This analysis has three primary findings.  Population inflows from New Orleans equal to 
1% of the destination county’s existing population are associated with a 4 to 8 percent increase in 
the contract rents of county natives and a 2 to 6 percent increase in their gross rents.  Estimates 
of the stock of rental housing in the destination counties suggest that migration had no 
statistically significant impact on the supply of rental housing.  The implied supply elasticity of 
rental housing ranges between 0 and 0.6, indicative of a relatively inelastic short-run housing 
supply.   
The rental estimates from this analysis are in tandem with the previous findings of Saiz 
(2003), in that migration, at least in the short run, increases the rents of the native population, 
and this possibly decreases their real incomes by increasing the proportion of their household 
earnings that must be spent on housing.  The short-run supply elasticity range from this study 
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complements the results from Saiz (2010).  He found that areas with fewer geographical land 
constraints, which is true of the counties in this study, had a more elastic supply estimate.  Saiz 
estimated long-run housing supply elasticities that ranged between 0.6 and 5.5 across 95 U.S. 
metropolitan areas. Particularly, in metropolitan areas such as Little Rock, AR, and Houston, 
Dallas, and San Antonio, TX, that are included in this study, his long run estimates ranged 
between 2.2 and 3.  Linking the short-run elasticity estimates from this paper to his results, 
supports the notion that supply becomes more elastic over the long-run.       
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1.2 gives a brief overview of 
the literature on the impact of migration and immigration on local economic conditions.  Section 
1.3 includes a basic theoretical framework and background discussion on the Hurricane Katrina 
evacuation.  Section 1.4 discusses the data and regression framework. Section 1.5 lays out the 
results, and Section 1.6 concludes with an overview and discussion of extensions on this 
analysis.   
 
1.2 Literature Review 
The early literature that examined the impact of immigration on economic conditions was 
primarily focused on local labor markets.  Altonji and Card (1989) estimated that an increase in 
immigrants equal to 1 percent of the statistical metropolitan statistical area’s (MSA) population 
decreased native wages by approximately 1.2 percent.  A study by Card (1990) found that 
immigration in Miami, following the Mariel boatlift, increased the supply of low-skilled 
workers, but that there was not a significant impact on wages or the unemployment rates of 
native low-skilled workers.    A latter study of labor supply accounting for differences in 
education and experience, however, estimated that immigration decreased native wages between 
3 and 4 percent (Borjas, 2003).   
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 Subsequent studies have examined the impact of migration and immigration on local 
economic conditions, such as housing prices.  Saiz (2003) estimated the impact of the Mariel 
boatlift on rental rates and real income in Miami.  He found that rents in Miami increased 
between 8 and 11 percent, compared to similar cities, and that this resulted in a short- run 
decrease of 1.4 percent in real income.  A study of U.S. MSAs found that immigration inflows 
equal to 1 percent of a city’s population were associated with a 1 percent increase in area median 
rents and housing prices (Saiz, 2007).   
The existing literature on housing supply is narrow, and there are few examples of short- 
run price elasticity of housing supply (DiPasquale 1999; Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo 2005).  
Saiz (2010) concluded that geographical land constraints were a key determinant of the long-run 
elasticity of housing supply.  He estimated that the average MSA had an elasticity of 1.75, and 
that areas with larger land constraints were more inelastic.  In a study of the impact of housing 
choice vouchers on rental prices, Susin (2002) found that an increase in voucher receipts raised 
MSA rents by an average of 16 percent.  He further asserted that his results were consistent with 
an inelastic supply of lower quality rental units.  Eriksen and Ross (2013) studied the effect of 
increased housing vouchers on rents.  They found that voucher recipients rented more expensive 
units, and that increases in individual rents were largest for these renters who were living in 
cities with a relatively inelastic housing supply.     
This study uses a similar approach as Saiz (2003), by examining the impact of a 
migration shock on local rental rates.  The nature of the forced evacuations and vast need for 
government housing assistance caused by hurricane Katrina would suggest that these movers 
were low-income and settled into low-quality housing.   
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1.4 Background 
1.4.1 Basic Theoretical Framework  
The standard supply and demand diagram illustrates the basic theoretical framework of 
the relationship between rents and migration.   Population changes caused by in-migration 
expands the market demand for rental housing in destination markets. If the local market supply 
is perfectly elastic, as shown in Figure 1.1.1, the supply of housing will adjust to the change in 
demand and rental rates will remain unchanged.   On the other hand, Figure 1.1.2 models a rental 
market where supply is relatively inelastic.  The diagram illustrates that a shock to demand will 
cause rental rates to increase, and the increase in rents may be proportionally larger than the 
change in available units.  
The migrants analyzed in this study are movers due to the unanticipated evacuations from 
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  As detailed below, the immediate 
circumstances and demographic profile of the majority of evacuees suggest that their move was 
exogenous, and that these movers became renters when they arrived to the new destinations.   
1.4.2 Timeline of the Hurricane   
Katrina made landfall on the South Florida Coast as a Category 1 hurricane on August 
25, 2005, and it began to intensify as it headed toward the Gulf Coasts of Mississippi and 
Louisiana one day later.  Federal emergencies were declared in the target areas on August 26, as 
those states began implementing disaster-response plans. The city of New Orleans was of 
particular concern, because its topography made it susceptible to destruction in the wake of a 
severe storm.   Between August 27 and 28, the storm gained strength, becoming a Category 5 
hurricane, as it continued heading towards the Gulf (U.S. Department of Commerce National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Weather Service, 2006).  In response, 
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officials in Mississippi and Louisiana ordered mandatory evacuations and began ramping up 
emergency-response plans (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
2006).  Aware that over 100,000 New Orleans’ residents did not own vehicles, and that 
disadvantaged populations, like the elderly, would face evacuation challenges, the Superdome 
was designated as a shelter of last resort (Lipton, 2015).  
Even though the State of Louisiana estimated that more than 1 million people evacuated 
before the storm made landfall, there were thousands who were not able to leave.  By August 28, 
approximately 30,000 sought shelter in the Superdome and thousands more decided to shelter in 
place and “wait out” the storm (http://www.pbs.org/frontline).  The morning of August 29, 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm and decimated several Mississippi coastal 
communities in its path.  Following the passage of Hurricane Katrina there was a breach in the 
17th Street and Industrial Canal levees that caused approximately 80 percent of New Orleans to 
be covered in 15-20 feet of water (U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration National Weather Service, 2006).    
Hurricane Katrina was one of the five deadliest and the costliest hurricane in U.S. history.  
The National Hurricane Center estimated that Hurricane Katrina left behind approximately $81.2 
billion in damages, and the National Weather Service estimated the total economic loss to be 
more than $100 billion (U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration National Weather Service, 2006).  More than 300,000 homes were severely 
damaged or decimated, and the infrastructure of the hardest-hit communities was completely 
destroyed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2006).   
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1.4.4 Evacuations as an Exogenous Shift 
The unanticipated and catastrophic flooding from levee breaches created an especially 
critical situation in New Orleans.  As flooding continued to overtake the city, more residents 
began arriving at the Superdome and others to the New Orleans’ Convention Center.  These 
locations, however, were not equipped to accommodate the large number of evacuees.  Sewage 
problems, overcrowding, and deficient supplies of food and water made the conditions at these 
centers deplorable.  Yet, flood victims continued arriving for emergency assistance even days 
later.   By August 30, Governor Blanco deemed the Superdome uninhabitable and ordered 
immediate and mandatory evacuations out of the stadium.  Meanwhile, the Governor and FEMA 
reached out to a number of states and local municipalities to make shelter and temporary housing 
arrangements for arriving evacuees.  Addressing the flood and the victims became a problem of 
epic proportion, and over four days between August 31 to September 3, FEMA, and the 
Departments of Defense and Transportation coordinated a plan which transported 23,000 people 
from Superdome to cities throughout the South with the majority arriving in Houston, TX.   On 
September 3, 25,000 people began boarding evacuation buses from the Convention Center, and 
on September 4, it was reported that 2,000 medical evacuees were waiting to leave the airport.  
By September 6, Mayor Nagin asserted that there were still 5,000-10,000 more people in the city 
that needed to be rescued or evacuated, and he ordered a mandatory evacuation of the entire city 
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/).  While there are no official estimates, given the 
compilation of accounts, a conservative estimate of the government-assisted evacuations equals 
55,000. A timeline of key Hurricane Katrina events compiled at The Brookings Institution 
estimated that 77,000 New Orleans residents were evacuated with government assistance 
(DeLozier and Kamp).      
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When evacuees boarded the buses and airplanes from New Orleans, they did so under 
strenuous circumstances without giving consideration to the economic conditions of the localities 
to which they would arrive.  Their migration was forced and simply a matter of the desperate 
need for safety and shelter.   Moreover, news reports indicated that evacuees boarded buses not 
knowing where they were going until they departed.   An overview of the media coverage, 
government transcripts, and Congressional reports clearly demonstrated that the pre-Katrina 
evacuations were sudden and unanticipated in length.  Likewise, post-Katrina evacuations were 
unplanned and haphazardly implemented with no thought-out plans to return the evacuees.   
1.4.5 Evacuee Demographics and Destinations 
The damage to the stock of housing made much of New Orleans uninhabitable.  
Consequently, this meant that persons who evacuated voluntarily and involuntarily were not able 
to return immediately.  For many, such circumstances warranted a long-term and, in many cases, 
permanent move. In total, New Orleans lost more than half of its population in the aftermath of 
Katrina (Plyer, 2015).  As of July 1, 2006, Frey, Singer, and Park (2007) estimated that the city’s 
population had fallen by 229,000.  New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, a part of the city’s interior, 
was the area most affected by flooding. According to 2000 Census data compiled by The Data 
Center, pre-Katrina, the area was 98% Black, 60% were renters, 40% lived below the poverty 
level, 32% did not access to a vehicle, and 70% had a high school diploma or less 
(datacenterresearch.org).  After the hurricane, it lost 85% of its pre-Katrina population (Jonassen, 
2012).    
Groen and Polivka (2008) estimated that of the evacuees who would return to Louisiana 
within a year of the hurricane, 97% had returned by December of 2005, and the average 
returning evacuee came back to their pre-storm address within 38 days.  Evacuees who were 
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black, single and never married, had school-age children, and had lower educational attainment 
and family income were less likely to return to high-damage areas (Groen and Polivka, 2010; 
Frey et al., 2007). For obvious reasons, those that were bused out of New Orleans were also 
likely to share the same demographic profile as the non-returner group.  Of the non-returners, 
more than 81% had relocated to counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, 
Georgia, Florida, and Arkansas (Groen and Polivka 2008).   Frey et al. (2007) also showed 
differences in migration patterns before and after the hurricane.  For example, pre-Katrina 
migration patterns show that more than half of New Orleans’s out-migrants moved to parishes 
(counties) in the New Orleans Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)1.  After the hurricane, the 
destination for out-migrants became more widespread with more than 50% going to counties in 
Texas, Georgia, and Tennessee.   Figure 1.2 illustrates the settlement pattern of New Orleans’ 
out-migrants, who left the city in 2005, using the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income 
data base.  The map illustrates that out migrants from this time period were scattered throughout 
U.S. counties, however, the highest concentrations are located in counties in the southern most 
region.   
1.4.6 Housing the Evacuees  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the basic flow of the evacuation and housing process.    Within the 
days and weeks following the storm, FEMA solicited various states to accept and provide 
housing for evacuees. States provided FEMA with the specific cities where victims could receive 
housing assistance and a corresponding maximum number of individuals to which services could 
be provided.  FEMA then transported evacuees by the number and to the localities as designated 
                                                          
1   Frey et al. (2007) construct migration patterns using ACS data.   
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by each state.   The agency also asked that receiving states treat the Katrina evacuees as disaster 
victims from their own states (McCarthy, 2008).    
FEMA provided housing assistance, similar to standard existing federal means-tested 
rental housing assistance, for Hurricane Katrina evacuees through provisions in Sections 403 and 
408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 2  Section 403 
provides federal assistance in order that states can provide for such immediate needs of disaster 
victims as emergency shelter.  The “shelter” application of Section 403 assistance, however, was 
intended for state-implemented short-term mass evacuation centers.  Unfortunately, the breadth 
of Katrina resulted in a need for Section 403 assistance to be used for up to 12 months, rather 
than for temporary shelter.       
States were reimbursed under the Section 403 provision to pay for evacuee housing costs 
in one of three ways.  States could either directly pay rental expenses, place evacuees in existing 
public housing units, or evacuees could transfer their existing Section 8 vouchers, if they had 
one.  Some localities created housing assistance vouchers especially for Katrina evacuees. In 
large MSAs like Houston and Dallas, the majority of rental assistance was paid directly by the 
state due to limited public housing stocks and existing Section 8 waiting lists.  Qualifications for 
Section 403 rental assistance only required that evacuees provide proof of having lived in the 
                                                          
2 Public housing units are publically financed housing developments that are overseen by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and managed by local housing authorities.  Existing public housing rules 
were also applicable to Katrina evacuees in that they were required to pay no more than 30% of their income in rent 
(www.portal.hud.gov).  Unfortunately, short supplies of public housing units are not uncommon, and this option was 
likely limited relative to the number of evacuees. Particularly, this was the case in Houston, TX (Joint Hurricane 
Housing Task Force Communications Team, 2006).  The majority of evacuees received voucher assistance which 
operated much like HUD’s Section 8 program with a few modifications.  In general, housing voucher programs give 
tenants a transferrable subsidy that is applied to a private market unit with rents at or below the Fair Market Rent 
(FMR).  FMR’s are set at the 40th percentile of the county’s or MSAs rents.  Under Section 8 rules, the recipient 
pays at most one third of their income towards their rent, and the voucher is used to cover the balance 
(www.huduser.gov).   
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disaster area, and security deposits and background checks were waived.  Rental units, however, 
had to meet the Section 8 program’s Fair Market Rent (FMR) and inspection standards before 
voucher reimbursement was granted to states.  By November, FEMA was compelled to relax the 
FMR restriction, and they allowed voucher recipients to pay differences for rents above the FMR 
out of pocket (Joint Hurricane Housing Task Force, 2006).  The Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress estimated that Section 403 assistance was applied to approximately 67,000 
apartment leases in 32 states (McCarthy, 2008).  
After the 12-month period of Section 403 assistance expired, FEMA transferred its 
housing assistance vouchers to provisions provided by Section 408, which had more eligibility 
restraints.  Receipt of Section 408 assistance required that FEMA determine whether the evacuee 
was experiencing financial hardship, their former residence was unlivable and/or had other 
related difficulties post-Katrina (McCarthy, 2008).   A key distinction of the Section 408 voucher 
assistance was that it was paid directly to the household.  The maximum time allotment for the 
Section 408 voucher was 18 months (Joint Hurricane Housing Task Force, 2006).   
 
1.5  Empirical Framework and Data 
In the empirical analysis, each county is treated as a local rental market.  Let c index the 
county, and t index the calendar year, then the econometric specification is 
(1)                                  𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝑐𝑡) =∝ +  𝛽𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡 
The dependent variable, ln(Rct), is the log of mean rents for county natives in each year.   Katrina 
is the main independent variable of interest, and it measures the migration rate as the inflow of 
Katrina evacuees over the destination county’s population. The vector X contains county 
attributes that affect rents, δ is the parameter vector associated with X, α is the intercept, and u is 
the error term.  The primary coefficient of interest is β, and it is interpreted as the percentage 
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change in rents of county natives for a 1 percentage point increase in the migration rate. Basic 
economic theory predicts β>0, if supply is not perfectly elastic, and there is an increase demand 
through in-migration.   
The primary objective of this analysis is to obtain consistent estimates of β.  There are, 
however, two possible identification issues.  First, rents and migration may be jointly 
determined.  The migration caused by Hurricane Katrina increases rents, but increased rents also 
may deter migration in spatial equilibrium (Moretti, 2011).  Second, there may be time- and 
county-varying unobservables, such as economic growth expectations, that are correlated with 
local migration and rental rates.  
The empirical framework addresses the identification issues in three ways.  First, county 
and yearly fixed effects are added to the specification to remove the time-invariant 
unobservables and any general time effects that affect local market rents.  Incorporating fixed 
effects, the error term is decomposed as follows   
(2)                                                       𝑢𝑐𝑡 = η𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑣𝑐𝑡 
where η is the county fixed effect, θ is the year fixed effect, and v represents the idiosyncratic 
error.  Second, following the literature that estimates the impact of immigration on rents, Saiz 
(2003, 2006), the specification includes controls for time- and county-varying market trends, 
represented by Xct in the empirical specification.  Lastly, the analysis relies on the exogenous 
nature of the Hurricane Katrina evacuations from New Orleans, discussed in Section 1.3, to 
identify consistent estimates of β.    
   To implement this, the analysis uses county-by-year panel data constructed from 
household observations in the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 
2010). These years straddle the occurrence of Hurricane Katrina and subsequent evacuations, but 
this time frame is before the onset of the financial crisis and Great Recession.  Unfortunately, the 
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2001-2004 ACS samples do not include county identifiers.  Table 1.1 shows the counties that are 
available in the data.  There are 39 counties in Louisiana and bordering states.   
The empirical analysis employs two measures of the dependent variable, R, that are 
available in the data.  Renters report two measures of rent, gross and contract, respectively.  The 
ACS defines contract rents as the rent amount specified in the lease agreement between the 
household and landlord. Whether this amount includes utilities and heating costs is contingent 
upon the terms in the lease.  Gross rents include contract rents, utilities, and heating costs for 
each household. The key explanatory variable, Katrina, is constructed from detailed questions 
about each household member’s moving status one year prior to the survey date.  Movers are 
also asked to indicate the foreign country, state, city or metropolitan statistical area of residence 
that they resided in before their move. This question facilitates the construction of a variable 
indicating whether the household moved from New Orleans.  A specific reference date for 
migration from New Orleans, however, is not available in the public-use file.  Since ACS data 
are non-overlapping and are collected monthly over the course of a year, this analysis follows the 
assumption used by Passel and Suro (2005).  In particular, data are assumed to be collected at the 
midpoint of the year.  As an example, for the respondent completing the survey at the midpoint 
of the 2006, July 1 would be the survey date.  Respondents that answer “yes” to having lived in 
New Orleans one year prior would have left New Orleans after July 1 of 2005.  The implication 
is that Katrina migrants will appear in both 2005 and 2006 ACS cohorts.  Katrina is measured as 
follows,    
(3)                                        𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 =
# 𝑁𝑂 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡−1
# 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡−2
× 100,   
where #NO Migrant Households is the number of households that moved from New Orleans one 
year before the survey date in each year, and #Native Households is the number households that 
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have no migrants in the survey year. The #Native Household variable is essentially an estimate of 
the stock of households before migrants arrived to the destination counties.   
  Summary statistics in Table 1.2 demonstrate that the average inflow of New Orleans 
migrants increased by nearly 50% between 2005 and 2006, and it falls by nearly twice the level 
between 2006 and 2007.   Sample average nominal rents and median nominal incomes are 
increasing, and the average unemployment rate for the sample is decreasing between 2005 and 
2007.   
 
1.6 Results  
Table 1.3 presents panel estimates for the effect of Katrina migration on native contract 
rents.  The basic theory that migration-induced increases in demand will increase rents in a 
housing market with a less than a perfectly elastic supply implies that 𝛽 is greater than zero.  In 
column 1, the fixed effects (FE) estimate of 𝛽, 𝛽 ̂, is equal to 0.084.  This result indicates that a 1 
percentage point increase in the population due to Katrina migration raises rents by 8.4 percent. 
To address heteroscedasticity in the error term, robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
With a robust standard error equal to 0.042 and at a 5% significance level, the null hypothesis 
that 𝛽 is equal to zero is rejected, and the results suggest that housing supply is not perfectly 
elastic.  Column 2 uses the same specification as column 1, but it includes controls for two 
county- and time-varying market trends, the unemployment rate and median income.  
Quantitatively, the estimate of 𝛽 in column 2 and its interpretation are not substantially different 
from the result in column 1.3    
                                                          
3 The sample is aggregated by household and then by county using the household sample weights provided by the 
ACS.  One concern however is that the ACS weights do adequately adjust for Katrina evacuee households causing 
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Column 3 uses the same specification as in column 1, but it employs a different 
estimator, namely, weighted FE estimates of 𝛽.  The weights are county-by-year cell sizes, in 
order to account for heteroscedasticity that is attributable to the varying numbers of household 
observations in each county.  The result implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
population due to Katrina migration, raises rents by 3.8 percent. With a standard error of 0.018, 
the null hypothesis that the supply is perfectly elastic is also rejected.  Colum 4 repeats the 
weighted FE estimates in column 3, but adds the two controls for market trends, and this estimate 
is not quantitatively different from the result in column 3.      
Table 1.4 repeats the fixed effects and weighted FE specifications from Table 1.3, except 
the outcome variable is gross rents, a broader measure of ln(R).  Column 1 presents the FE 
estimate of  𝛽 equal to 0.060 with a robust standard error of 0.034.  This result also rejects the 
null that Katrina migration had no impact on rental rates.  The estimate, however, implies that a 1 
percentage point increase in Katrina migrants increased native gross rents by 6 percent, and that 
rental housing supply is not perfectly elastic.  The estimate and interpretation of 𝛽, from the 
specification in column 2, is also not quantitatively different from that in column 1.  Columns 3 
and 4 show nearly identical weighted FE estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on gross 
rents, though the estimates are somewhat less precise.4   
                                                          
certain segments of this group to be underrepresented (Sastry and Gregory, 2012). This could affect how the Katrina 
migration variable is measured and bias results downwards.   
 
4Additional dynamic panel data analyses were conducted to address a potential Nickell bias which is a consequence 
of data that has a relatively small number of time periods and a large sample size.  Within the context of this study, 
Nickell (1981) asserted that the demeaning process which subtracts the county’s mean rent and each explanatory 
variable from the respective variable creates a correlation between the regressor and the error. Coefficient estimates 
using Arellano and Bond (AB) approach, however yield results that are quantitatively similar to fixed effects and 
weighted fixed effects estimates reported in the study.   
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An increase in rents without a proportional increase in income would effectively decrease 
the native household’s real income.  Table 1.5 shows fixed effects and weighted FE estimates of 
the impact of Katrina migration on the median real income of all native renters.  Column 1 
employs FE estimation, and column 2 uses weighted FE.  The results in both columns are small 
and show that Katrina migration had no impact, which was statistically different from zero, on 
the income of renter households.   
Following Saiz (2003) an estimation is done to simulate how changes in the rent, due to 
migration, may increase the proportion of income paid for rent. The pre-Katrina rent-to-income 
ratio is the amount of gross rent expenses divided by the total household income in 2005.    
Assuming that there were no changes in other consumption goods and that income was 
unchanged, a simulated increase in the rent-to-income ratio is calculated by multiplying the gross 
rents by 5.3 percent from Table 1.4, column 2.  This rent increase is then divided by household 
income and compared to the Pre-Katrina ratio. To account for certain household outliers, whose 
rent-to-income ratio is greater than one, the median county ratios are used for a more accurate 
account of central tendency.   The pre-Katrina rent-to-income ratio is equal to 26.5 percent, and 
the post migration income ratio is 28 percent.  This estimate suggests that Katrina migration 
decreased real income through rents by 1.5 percent.  This estimate is also consistent with Saiz 
(2003) who found that rent increases, due to the Mariel boatlift, decreased the real wages of 
native Miami residents by 1.42%.    
A potential concern is the means by which government officials determined the 
maximum number of evacuees that would be received in each area.  If officials based this 
number on the stock of available rental housing, estimates of the Katrina migration impact on 
rental market outcomes would be inconsistent.  Numerous media reports and press releases 
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however, suggest that the maximum number of evacuees was determined by the number beds 
available in emergency shelters and/or as a means of political posturing (Falkenberg 2006; 
Gelinas 2006; State of IL Press Release, 2005).  The supposition that the local area’s housing 
supply determined the number of evacuees received is further examined by measuring the 
correlation between rental housing vacancy rates and Katrina migration rates.  Data on rental 
vacancy rates for the 75 largest MSA’s are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Housing 
Vacancy Survey, and ACS data are aggregated by MSA to calculate Katrina migration rates for 
each MSA.  Table 1.6 presents reduced-form results that estimate the impact of vacancy rates on 
Katrina migration rates in each MSA while controlling for the distance from New Orleans.  
Column 1 shows that there is little correlation between the 2004 vacancy rate on the 2005 
Katrina migration rate.  Column 2 shows similar results using the migration rate from the 2006 
cohort.  Based on these results, it appears that the size of Katrina migration was exogenous with 
respect to the destination area’s rental housing supply.   
Table 1.7 shows estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on the supply of rental 
housing using the following model which is isomorphic to equation (2),      
(4)                                ln (𝑄𝑐𝑡) =∝𝑐+  𝜑𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡.    
The independent variable, ln (Q), is the log of the number of renter households and φ is the 
parameter estimate of the impact of Katrina migration on the housing supply.  Earlier results 
reported in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that the rental market in not perfectly elastic but plausibly 
inelastic due to its durable nature.  Therefore it is expected that 𝜑 will be relatively small, 
compared to 𝛽, and not statistically different from zero.  Column 1 in Table 1.7 presents the FE 
estimate and robust standard error of  𝜑.   The fixed effects estimate is negative, but it is very 
small and not statistically different from 0, as expected.  In column 2, the weighted FE estimate 
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is positive, but this result is not statistically different from zero either.  In general, empirical 
estimates from equation (4) support the implication that the supply of rental units is relatively 
inelastic within the time frame that this data covers.   
 Multiplying the parameter estimates, ?̂? and 𝛽 ̂, by the mean number of native renter 
households and mean rental rates, respectively, gives elasticity estimates of those variables with 
respect to Katrina migration.  Hence, housing supply elasticity with respect to rent estimates are 
calculated as follows,   
(5)                                             
[
%𝛥𝑄
%𝛥𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎 
]
[
%Δ𝑅
%Δ𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎
]
   =  
%ΔQ
%Δ𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡
.   
A range of supply elasticity estimates are calculated using values of 𝛽 ̂and ?̂?.  Where ?̂? is equal 
to 0, the housing supply is perfectly inelastic.  Employing 𝛽 ̂ equal to 0.08 and ?̂? equal to 0.016, 
the supply elasticity is equal to 0.2.   
 Two stage least squares regressions are implemented to calculate standard errors that will 
test the significance of elasticity estimates.  Table 1.8 shows two-stage least squares estimates of 
supply elasticity, based on the following specification, 
(6)                                         𝑙𝑛 (𝑄𝑐𝑡) = 𝛾 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅)𝑐𝑡  + 𝜹𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡,  
where the parameter, 𝛾, measures the elasticity of housing supply and the instrument is Katrina 
migration.  The elasticity estimate in column 1 is small and the standard error indicates that this 
result is not statistically different from zero.  Column 2 presents the weighted FE estimate of  𝛾.    
That standard error also implies that the null hypothesis that 𝛾 is equal to zero, is not rejected.  
Table 1.9 repeats the specifications from Table 1.8, but second stage estimates use the predicted 
values of gross rents.  The estimated supply elasticities are similar.  In general, the interpretation 
of supply elasticity results suggest that, in the short-run, the market for rental housing is not 
perfectly elastic but supply-inelastic, with elasticity estimates that range between 0 and 0.65.    
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 As previously indicated, the majority of non-returning Katrina evacuees were black 
households in which the highest level of education completed was a high school diploma. 
Therefore, it is plausible that native households with similar characteristics may have 
experienced quantitatively larger impacts from the Katrina migration when compared to their 
native counterparts.  The specifications in Table 1.10 show weighted FE results that allow for 
heterogeneity using subsamples of renters based on gross rental rates compared to the Fair 
Market Rents (FMR), race, and education, respectively.  Column 1 shows estimates for the 
sample split where native gross rents are equal to or less than the county’s FMR, as determined 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and column 2 shows estimates 
for the sample split where rents are greater than the FMR.5  Column 1 shows a relatively small 
impact, less than 1 percent, of Katrina migration on the rents of natives paying less than the 
FMR, and column 2 suggests that migration increased rents above the FMR by 4.2 percent.  A 
test of the null that these two estimates are equal, however, yields that the difference between the 
two results is not statistically significant.  Column 3 reports estimates for native black 
households, and column 4 shows estimates for native non-black households.  Results show a 
marginally larger impact of Katrina migration on black households, though robust standard 
errors indicate that this estimate is not statistically different from zero. A test also indicates that, 
by conventional criteria, the difference between these two estimates is not statistically different.  
Columns 5 and 6 show impacts based on two education levels.  A high school diploma is the 
highest grade completed for one group, and having completed at least 1 year of college describes 
                                                          
5 Fair Market Rents (FMRs) are primarily used to determine payment standard amounts for the Housing Choice 
Voucher program, and serve as a rent ceiling in other programs.  FMRs are gross rent estimates that include rent and 
the cost of utilities.  The FMR is set as the 40th percentile rent which is drawn from the distribution of rents of all 
units occupied by recent movers in a county (https://www.huduser.gov).   
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the second group.  Column 5 suggests that a 1 percentage-point increase in Katrina migration 
increased the rents of households with a high school diploma or less by 6 percent.  The change in 
rents for more educated households, in column 6, is 4.6 percent, but this estimate is not 
statistically different from zero, and a test reveals that there is also not a significant difference 
between the rent estimates of educated and less-educated households.  Overall, the point 
estimates in Table 1.10 suggest some heterogeneity in impacts, but the estimates are not precise 
enough to draw any firm conclusions.   
 Even though Katrina migrants were spread in counties throughout the U.S., most 
households evacuated to southern states.  Earlier estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on 
native rents restricted this analysis to counties in Louisiana and bordering states primarily 
because these counties are geographically closer to New Orleans and comparable along other 
economic and geographic dimensions.  Additional analysis however is conducted to determine 
the impact of Katrina migration on native rents in counties in states that are contiguous to border 
states.  Table 1.11 shows estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on native rents where the 
sample also includes counties in Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Alabama.  Columns 1 and 2 show 
fixed effects results and columns 3 and 4 show weighted FE estimates of Katrina migration on 
contract rents respectively.  The coefficients suggest that Katrina migration increased contract 
rents in local markets, but these results are somewhat smaller and less precise than the 
counterparts in Table 1.3, but not statistically different.  Columns 5 and 6 show FE results and 
columns 7 and 8 show weighted FE results for gross rents.  Similar to earlier results in Table 1.4, 
the impact of Katrina migration is positive.  These estimates, however, are also quantitatively 
smaller and less precise than the panel estimates of gross rents that only include border counties.   
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1.7 Conclusion   
 
This paper used the exogenous shock of an increase in rental demand caused by the 
evacuation of Hurricane Katrina victims throughout the South to estimate the impact of 
migration on rents. A panel of 39 counties was constructed using ACS data to determine market 
rents and Katrina migration rates in evacuee destination counties in Louisiana and its bordering 
states, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas.  The analysis found that the migration of hurricane 
victims had a significant impact on the local economic conditions.  Specifically, the analysis 
estimated that Katrina migration caused increases in rental rates of county natives between 3 and 
8 percent.   
The empirical results in this analysis are consistent with the existing literature. Saiz 
(2003) estimated that immigration caused differential rent increases between 8 percent and 11 
percent in Miami, and that national immigration inflows caused a 1 percent increase in rents 
(2006).   The supply elasticity was estimated between 0 and 0.60, suggesting that rental housing 
supply is inelastic in the short-run.  These results are also in tandem with Saiz (2010) who 
estimated long-run supply elasticities between 2.2 and 3 in metropolitan areas that were in 
included in this panel.    
There are three natural directions in which the analysis could be expanded.  One 
dimension is spatial heterogeneity in impacts.  In particular, rental housing markets, especially 
those for lower-income individuals are more geographically concentrated than at the county 
level.  Data on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) claims are available at the zip 
code level, which could be used to examine more localized impacts.  Next, the impact of 
migration on natives may have led to changes in household composition.  Hence, an additional 
extension of this study is to determine if migration had an impact on native household crowding.  
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Lastly, there are other data available from the RAND Corporation, which collected more detailed 
information on individuals and households that were evacuated, both involuntarily and 
voluntarily after Hurricane Katrina, in their Displaced New Orleans Residents Survey (DNORS).   
This dataset would be useful in analyzing the long-term impacts of the evacuation, because the 
data have specific information on the tenure of evacuees in their destination counties.  
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  Figure 1.1.1 – Perfectly Elastic Supply 
 
 
Figure 1.1.2 – Inelastic Supply  
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  Figure 1.2 
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Figure 1.3- Evacuee Flow Chart 
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Table 1.1:  Average New Orleans Household Migration Rates for 39 
ACS Sample Counties 
 
  New Orleans Migrants Per 100 Natives 
 County 2005 2006 2007 
 
 
Benton, AR 0.156 0 0 
 Pulaski, AR 0 0.742 0 
 Washington, AR 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Caddo, LA 0.082 0.954 0.126 
 Calcasieu, LA 0 0.877 0.219 
 Ouachita, LA 0.646 0.488 0 
 Rapides, LA 2.874 1.191 0.196 
 Tangipahoa, LA 0.886 1.690 0.451 
 Terrebonne, LA 0 0.729 0 
  
De Soto, MS 0 0 0 
 Harrison, MS 0 0 0 
 Jackson, MS 0.544 0 0 
 Rankin, MS 0 0 0 
  
Bexar, TX 0.194 0.235 0 
 Brazoria, TX 0 0 0 
 Brazos, TX 0 0.170 0 
 Cameron, TX 0 0 0 
 Collin, TX 0.135 0.365 0 
 Dallas, TX 0.308 0.493 0.020 
 Denton, TX 0.322 0.139 0 
 Ector, TX 0 0 0 
 Ellis, TX 0 0.155 0 
 El Paso, TX 0 0 0 
 Fort Bend, TX 0 0.229 0 
 Galveston, TX 0 0.094 0.325 
 Harris, TX 0.697 1.446 0.127 
 Hidalgo, TX 0 0 0 
 Jefferson, TX 0.327 0.076 0.099 
 Johnson, TX 0 0 0 
 Lubbock, TX 0 0.374 0 
 Mclennan, TX 0 0 0 
 Midland, TX 0 0 0 
 Potter, TX 0 0 0 
 Randall, TX 0.157 0 0 
 Smith, TX 0.183 0.333 0.279 
     Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
 
                Table 1 continued on next page 
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Table 1.1 continued:  Average New Orleans Household Migration 
Rates for 39 ACS Sample Counties 
 
  New Orleans Migrants Per 100 Natives 
 County 2005 2006 2007 
  
Taylor, TX 0 0 0 
 Webb, TX 0 0 0 
 Wichita, TX 0 0 0 
 Williamson, TX 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Means  
(Standard Deviation) 
.193 
(.493) 
.276 
(.435) 
.047 
(.106) 
      Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 1.2: ACS Means and Standard Deviations for Rents and Time 
Varying County Trends 
 Variable 2005 2006 2007 
 
Contract Rent 
483 
(109) 
505 
(111) 
541 
(123) 
 
Gross Rent 
621 
(115) 
663 
(121) 
697 
(133) 
 
Gross Rent-Low Income 
558 
(118) 
593 
(121) 
616 
(129) 
 
Gross Rent-Moderate Income 
722 
(144) 
775 
(158) 
823 
(176) 
 
Gross Rent –High Income 
848 
(216) 
904 
(233) 
967 
(214) 
 
Median Household Income (t-1) 
40,691 
(10,802) 
46,732 
(11,503) 
49,590 
(12,120) 
 
Unemployment Rate 
7.37 
(2.36) 
6.51 
(1.82) 
5.45 
(1.51) 
  
Number of Counties 39 39 39 
 Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 1.3: Panel Estimates of Contract Rent for Natives using 2005-2007ACS Sample Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Log Contract Rent 
Independent Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Weighted FE 
(4) 
Weighted FE 
Katrina HH Migration per 100 .084  
(.042) 
.075 
 (.038) 
.038  
(.018) 
.037  
(.018) 
Log Median HH Income  -.184 
 (.091) 
 -.133  
(.123) 
Unemployment Rate  -.008  
(.007) 
 -.011  
(.006) 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of Observations 117 117 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by the number of renter households in 
each county.   
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Table 1.4: Panel Estimates of Gross Rent for Natives using 2005-2007ACS Sample Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Log Contract Rent 
Independent Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Weighted FE 
(4) 
Weighted FE 
Katrina HH Migration per 100 .060 
(.034) 
.053 
(.031) 
.025 
(.016) 
.024 
(.016) 
Log Median HH Income  -.139 
(.092) 
 -.125 
(.112) 
Unemployment Rate  -.005 
(.005) 
 -.010 
(.006) 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of Observations 117 117 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by the number of renter households in 
each county.   
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Table 1.5: Panel Estimates of Native Household Median Income using 2005-2007 ACS    
Sample Data, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
 
      Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by the number 
of renter households in each county.   
 
    
 
 Log Median Household Income of Natives 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Weighted FE 
Katrina HH Migration per 100 -.014 
(.018) 
-.009 
(.017) 
 
Year Control Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes 
   
Number of Observations 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 
32 
 
Table 1.6: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the 
Relationship between Katrina Migration and MSA Vacancy 
Rates, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                       Note: Standard errors are in parentheses   
    
 Katrina Migration  
 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
2005 
(2) 
2006 
Vacancy Rate 2004 -.00002 
 (.0034) 
.0048 
(.0067) 
Log Distance to New Orleans 
 
-.0787 
(.0228) 
-.1247 
(.0068) 
Number of Observations 60 60 
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Table 1.7: Panel Estimates of Rental Housing Stock using 2005-2007ACS  
Sample Data, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Log Renter Households 
Independent Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Weighted FE 
Katrina HH Migration per 100 -.001 
(.020) 
.016 
(.017) 
   
   
 
Year Control Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors  
are clustered at the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by the  
number of renter households in each county.   
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Table 1.8: Panel Estimates of the Rental Housing Stock using Katrina Household 
Migration as an Instrument for Contract Rent, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   
 Log Number of Renter Households 
Independent Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Weighted FE 
Log Contract Rent -.008 
(.301) 
.420 
(.501) 
   
   
 
 
Year Control Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes 
   
Number of Observations 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by the number     
of renter households in each county.   
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Table 1.9: Panel Estimates of the Rental Housing Stock using Katrina Household 
Migration as an Instrument for Gross Rent, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   
 Log Number of Renter Households 
Independent Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Weighted FE 
Log Gross Rent -.0007 
(.020) 
.649 
(.849) 
   
   
 
 
Year Control Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes 
   
Number of Observations 117 117 
Number of Counties 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors 
are clustered at the county level. Weighted FE specifications are weighted by 
the number of renter households in each county.   
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Table 1.10: Weighted Fixed Effects Estimates of Native Household Gross Rents by Household Demographic Characteristics, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Weighted FE 
specifications are weighted by the number of renter households in each county.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Log Gross Rents 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
Rent less 
than FMR 
(2) 
Rent more 
than FMR 
(3 ) 
Black 
(4) 
Non-Black 
(5) 
High School 
Diploma 
(6) 
College 
 
 Katrina HH Migration per 100 .007  
(.014) 
.042 
(.027) 
.068 
(.064) 
 
.034 
(.020) 
.060 
(.029) 
.046 
(.039) 
 Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
 Number of Observations 117 117 114 117 117 117 
 Number of Counties 39 39 39 39 39 39 
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Table 1.11: Panel Estimates of Native Household Rents using Counties Contiguous to Louisiana Border States, Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Weighted FE 
specifications are weighted by the number of renter households in each county.   
 
 
   
 
 Contract Rent for Natives  Gross Rent for Natives 
Independent 
Variables 
(1 ) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Weighted 
FE 
(4) 
Weighted 
FE 
 (5 ) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(7) 
Weighted 
FE 
(8) 
Weighted 
FE 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 
100 
.064 
(.046) 
.056 
(.043) 
.025 
(.018) 
.025 
(.018) 
 .044 
(.036) 
.038 
(.034) 
.016 
(.016) 
.017 
(.015) 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 -.052 
(.127) 
 -.063 
(.122) 
  -.026 
(.112) 
 -.055 
(.109) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 -.001 
(.007) 
 
 
-.011 
(.006) 
  -.008 
(.006) 
 -.009 
(.005) 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Number of 
Observations 
159 159 159 159  159 159 159 159 
Number of 
Counties 
53 53 53 53  53 53 53 53 
38 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The Impact of Hurricane Katrina Migration on Crime 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Hurricane Katrina struck the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana Gulf Coasts on August 
29, 2005, and it is characterized as one of the five deadliest and the costliest hurricane in U.S. 
history. Levee breaches following the storm caused more than 80 percent of the city of New 
Orleans to be covered in up to 20 feet of water, and this led to the exodus of more than 400,000 
New Orleans residents to various destinations throughout the United States.  Furthermore, for 
some evacuees, the storm’s destruction necessitated a long term resettlement in their destination 
towns and cities.  Even though the evacuations were wide spread, the majority of those fleeing 
Hurricane Katrina landed in the South.  The Houston Chronicle estimated, for example, that over 
100,000 of the more than 250,000 Katrina evacuees that landed in Houston had made the city 
their home by October 2005 (Turner, 2015).  Although Houston residents initially welcomed 
Katrina evacuees, their compassion soon turned into ridicule as they reportedly began to view the 
evacuees as the source of increased crime (Holeywell, 2015).  For example, local and national 
headlines read as follows; “After welcoming evacuees, Houston handles spike in crime” 
(Moreno, 2006) and “New Orleans failures brought crime to Houston” (Cobb, 2006).    
In general, spatial differences in location specific characteristics such as crime will be 
capitalized into housing prices. For example, Thaler (1978) documented an inverse relationship 
between property crimes and property values, and Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) reported 
substantial declines in house values in high crime areas. Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimated 
the impact of crime on housing prices and found that homes directly across adjacent to a 
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registered sex offender experienced a 12 percent decline in value.  When there is a population 
influx of persons experiencing psychological and economic traumas combined with the fact that 
these non-returners were more likely to be economically vulnerable before the evacuations, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that there may be an increase in crime in areas that received Katrina 
evacuees. Furthermore, if there were increases in crime, the expectation is that this would be 
reflected in decreases in rents since the majority of Katrina evacuees received housing assistance 
in the form of rental vouchers.  
The preceding chapter of this dissertation examined the impact that this Katrina-propelled 
migration had on rents in the destination counties.  The study concluded that population inflows 
from New Orleans equal to 1% of the destination county’s existing population were associated 
with a 4 to 8 percent increase in the contract rents of county natives and a 2 to 6 percent increase 
in their gross rents.  Therefore, given that rents in these areas increased as a result of Katrina 
migration, it can be inferred that crime levels in these destinations remained unchanged or at 
least were not substantially increased by the evacuees.  This paper follows the empirical 
framework of the preceding chapter by exploiting the quasi-experimental nature of these 
evacuations to evaluate whether this mass migration had an impact on crime levels in the 
destination counties.    
Data on crime levels are extracted from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting database and data on household migration from New Orleans and additional 
covariates in evacuee destination counties are extracted from the American Community Survey 
(ACS) data set.  Negative binominal with fixed effects regressions are employed to infer a causal 
relationship between Katrina migration and crime.  In general, this analysis finds that the 
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migration of Katrina evacuees into various counties throughout Louisiana and its border states of 
Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas did not cause a substantial increase in crime levels.      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 gives a brief overview of 
the literature on the impact of natural disasters on crime.  Section 2.3 entails a background 
discussion on the Hurricane Katrina evacuation.  Section 2.4 discusses the data and regression 
framework. Section 2.5 lays out the results, and Section 2.6 concludes with an overview and 
discussion of the results.   
 
2.2 Literature Review 
This paper draws from the literature that examines the link between natural disasters and 
crime.  There are two fundamental principles that explain how natural disasters impact crime.  
One proposition suggests that natural disasters provoke social and institutional altruism which 
can lead to decreases in crime.  The second proposition maintains that the destruction and trauma 
caused by disasters lead to breakdowns in social cohesion and the mechanics that are used to 
maintain control, thereby causing increased crime (Zahran, Shelley, Peek, and Brody, 2009).  
Studies that empirically assess these competing propositions draw varying conclusions.  For 
example, an analysis of the impact of Hurricane Hugo in Charlotte, North Carolina, in 1989 
asserted that on the day that the storm arrived and the three days following, burglary reports 
increased (LeBeau, 2002).  Lemieux (2014) studied changes in crime in Montreal, Quebec, 
following a 1998 ice storm that generated an extended blackout in the city. This study found that 
state sponsored relief programs via the issuance of disaster relief checks were linked to a decline 
in property crimes.  He further rationalized that the decrease in property crimes may have been a 
consequence of the altruistic government response which was motivated by the disaster.  A 
longitudinal research study on the impact of natural disasters on crime in Florida concluded that 
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natural disasters significantly decreased levels of property and violent crimes but significantly 
increased the expected count of reported domestic violence crimes (Zahran, Shelley, Peek, and 
Brody, 2009).   
The literature that examines the impact of disaster on crime has primarily focused on the 
impact on crime in the disaster area.  The catastrophic damage left in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina on other hand facilitated the need to quickly evacuate thousands of New Orleans 
residents outside of the city for a sustained period of time.  Crime impacts may have not been 
experienced in New Orleans alone, but also in evacuee destination communities.  The existing 
literature on the impact of Katrina movers on crime however is narrow.   
Houston, Texas, absorbed the largest number of evacuees outside of the state of 
Louisiana.  In fact, Houston officials estimated that 250,000 people arrived there in the wake of 
the storm, and one year later approximately 150,000 New Orleans evacuees remained in the city 
(Bliss, 2015).  Even though evacuees were initially welcomed to Houston, media reports cast a 
preponderance of blame on Katrina evacuees for a perceived spike in Houston’s crime rate 
(Holeywell, 2015).  Settles and Lindsay (2011) conducted a quantitative analysis of pre- and 
post-Katrina crimes, and a qualitative analysis of the exaggeration of media reports to test 
whether the in-migration of Katrina evacuees had in fact led to increased crime.  The study found 
little empirical evidence that crimes rates had actually increased.   
Varano, Schafer, Cancino, Decker, and Green (2010) studied the Katrina-related effects 
on crime over a 12-month period in 3 major metropolitan cities that received a relatively large 
number of evacuees, Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix.  The study extracted weekly crime 
data from the police departments in each location, which resulted in 87 pre-Katrina migration 
and 56 post-Katrina migration observations.  The authors employed interrupted time series 
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analysis to draw inferences about the effects of Katrina on crime in the destination counties.  
This study found that there were modest effects on murder and robbery in Houston and Phoenix 
that were likely attributable to the rapid increase in the population post-Katrina migration.  After 
controlling for existing trends in these destination cities, rises in certain other serious crimes like 
burglary, assault, rape, and auto theft could not be directly or independently  
attributed to Hurricane Katrina.  Leitner and Helbich (2010) investigated the influence of 
Hurricane Katrina on the spatio-temporal distribution of crime clusters in Houston, and they 
found no significant impact.   
 
2.3 Background  
The disaster victims analyzed in this study are migrants due to the unanticipated 
evacuations from New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  As detailed below, the 
immediate circumstances and demographic profile of the majority of evacuees suggest that their 
move was exogenous.  The study relies on the exogenous nature of these moves to in part 
identify the impact that their long-term evacuation had on crime in the destination counties.   The 
following sections provide background information that further explain why these moves are 
exploited as exogenous.   
2.3.1 Timeline of the Hurricane   
Katrina made landfall on the South Florida Coast as a Category 1 hurricane on August 
25, 2005, and it began to intensify as it headed toward the Gulf Coasts of Mississippi and 
Louisiana one day later.  Federal emergencies were declared in the target areas on August 26, as 
those states began implementing disaster-response plans. The city of New Orleans was of 
particular concern, because its topography made it susceptible to destruction in the wake of a 
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severe storm.   Between August 27 and 28, the storm gained strength, becoming a Category 5 
hurricane, as it continued heading towards the Gulf (U.S. Department of Commerce National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Weather Service, 2006).  In response, 
officials in Mississippi and Louisiana ordered mandatory evacuations and began ramping up 
emergency-response plans (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
2006).  Aware that over 100,000 New Orleans’ residents did not own vehicles, and that 
disadvantaged populations, like the elderly, would face evacuation challenges, the Superdome 
was designated as a shelter of last resort (Lipton, 2015).  
Even though the State of Louisiana estimated that more than 1 million people evacuated 
before the storm made landfall, there were thousands who were not able to leave.  By August 28, 
approximately 30,000 sought shelter in the Superdome and thousands more decided to shelter in 
place and “wait out” the storm (http://www.pbs.org/frontline).  The morning of August 29, 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm and decimated several Mississippi coastal 
communities in its path.  Following the passage of Hurricane Katrina there was a breach in the 
17th Street and Industrial Canal levees that caused approximately 80 percent of New Orleans to 
be covered in 15-20 feet of water (U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration National Weather Service, 2006).    
Hurricane Katrina was one of the five deadliest and the costliest hurricane in U.S. history.  
The National Hurricane Center estimated that Hurricane Katrina left behind approximately $81.2 
billion in damages, and the National Weather Service estimated the total economic loss to be 
more than $100 billion (U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration National Weather Service, 2006).  More than 300,000 homes were severely 
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damaged or decimated, and the infrastructure of the hardest-hit communities was completely 
destroyed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2006).   
2.3.2 Evacuations as an Exogenous Shift 
The unanticipated and catastrophic flooding from levee breaches created an especially 
critical situation in New Orleans.  As flooding continued to overtake the city, more residents 
began arriving at the Superdome and others to the New Orleans’ Convention Center.  These 
locations, however, were not equipped to accommodate the large number of evacuees.  Sewage 
problems, overcrowding, and deficient supplies of food and water made the conditions at these 
centers deplorable.  Yet, flood victims continued arriving for emergency assistance even days 
later.   By August 30, Governor Blanco deemed the Superdome uninhabitable and ordered 
immediate and mandatory evacuations out of the stadium.  Meanwhile, the Governor and FEMA 
reached out to a number of states and local municipalities to make shelter and temporary housing 
arrangements for arriving evacuees.  Addressing the flood and the victims became a problem of 
epic proportion, and over four days between August 31 to September 3, FEMA, and the 
Departments of Defense and Transportation coordinated a plan which transported 23,000 people 
from Superdome to cities throughout the South with the majority arriving in Houston, TX.   On 
September 3, 25,000 people began boarding evacuation buses from the Convention Center, and 
on September 4, it was reported that 2,000 medical evacuees were waiting to leave the airport.  
By September 6, Mayor Nagin asserted that there were still 5,000-10,000 more people in the city 
that needed to be rescued or evacuated, and he ordered a mandatory evacuation of the entire city 
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/).  While there are no official estimates, given the 
compilation of accounts, a conservative estimate of the government-assisted evacuations equals 
55,000. A timeline of key Hurricane Katrina events compiled at The Brookings Institution 
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estimated that 77,000 New Orleans residents were evacuated with government assistance 
(DeLozier and Kamp).      
When evacuees boarded the buses and airplanes from New Orleans, they did so under 
strenuous circumstances without giving consideration to the economic conditions of the localities 
to which they would arrive.  Their migration was forced and simply a matter of the desperate 
need for safety and shelter.   Moreover, news reports indicated that evacuees boarded buses not 
knowing where they were going until they departed.   An overview of the media coverage, 
government transcripts, and Congressional reports clearly demonstrated that the pre-Katrina 
evacuations were sudden and unanticipated in length.  Likewise post-Katrina evacuations were 
unplanned and haphazardly implemented with no thought-out plans to return the evacuees.   
2.3.3 Evacuee Demographics and Destinations 
The damage to the stock of housing made much of New Orleans uninhabitable.  
Consequently, this meant that persons who evacuated voluntarily and involuntarily were not able 
to return immediately.  For many, such circumstances warranted a long-term and, in many cases, 
permanent move. In total, New Orleans lost more than half of its population in the aftermath of 
Katrina (Plyer, 2015).  As of July 1, 2006, Frey et al. (2007) estimated that the city’s population 
had fallen by 229,000.  New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, a part of the city’s interior, was the 
area most affected by flooding. According to 2000 Census data compiled by The Data Center, 
pre-Katrina, the area was 98% Black, 60% were renters, 40% lived below the poverty level, 32% 
did not access to a vehicle, and 70% had a high school diploma or less (datacenterresearch.org).  
After the hurricane, it lost 85% of its pre-Katrina population (Jonassen, 2012).    
Groen and Polivka (2008) estimated that of the evacuees who would return to Louisiana 
within a year of the hurricane, 97% had returned by December of 2005, and the average 
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returning evacuee came back to their pre-storm address within 38 days.  Evacuees who were 
black, single and never married, had school-age children, and had lower educational attainment 
and family income were less likely to return to high-damage areas (Groen and Polivka, 2010; 
Frey et al., 2007). For obvious reasons, those that were bused out of New Orleans were also 
likely to share the same demographic profile as the non-returner group.  Of the non-returners, 
more than 81% had relocated to counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, 
Georgia, Florida, and Arkansas (Groen and Polivka 2008).   Frey et al. (2007) also showed 
differences in migration patterns before and after the hurricane.  For example, pre-Katrina 
migration patterns show that more than half of New Orleans’s out-migrants moved to parishes 
(counties) in the New Orleans Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  After the hurricane, the 
destination for out-migrants became more widespread with more than 50% going to counties in 
Texas, Georgia, and Tennessee.   Figure 1.2 illustrates the settlement pattern of New Orleans’ 
out-migrants, who left the city in 2005, using the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income 
data base.  The map illustrates that out migrants from this time period were scattered throughout 
U.S. counties, however, the highest concentrations are located in counties in the southern most 
region.   
2.3.4 Housing the Evacuees  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the basic flow of the evacuation and housing process.    Within the 
days and weeks following the storm, FEMA solicited various states to accept and provide 
housing for evacuees. States provided FEMA with the specific cities where victims could receive 
housing assistance and a corresponding maximum number of individuals to which services could 
be provided.  FEMA then transported evacuees by the number and to the localities as designated 
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by each state.   The agency also asked that receiving states treat the Katrina evacuees as disaster 
victims from their own states (McCarthy, 2008).    
FEMA provided housing assistance, similar to standard existing federal means-tested 
rental housing assistance, for Hurricane Katrina evacuees through provisions in Sections 403 and 
408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Section 403 
provides federal assistance in order that states can provide for such immediate needs of disaster 
victims as emergency shelter.  The “shelter” application of Section 403 assistance, however, was 
intended for state-implemented short-term mass evacuation centers.  Unfortunately, the breadth 
of Katrina resulted in a need for Section 403 assistance to be used for up to 12 months, rather 
than for temporary shelter. Qualifications for Section 403 rental assistance only required that 
evacuees provide proof of having lived in the disaster area, and security deposits and background 
checks were waived.  The Congressional Research Service Report for Congress estimated that 
Section 403 assistance was applied to approximately 67,000 apartment leases in 32 states 
(McCarthy, 2008).  
 
2.4 Empirical Framework and Data 
The empirical analysis tests whether the influx of Hurricane Katrina evacuees increased 
crime rates in the counties where they eventually resettled.  Let c index the county, and t index 
the calendar year, then the econometric specification is 
(7)                                  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑡 =∝ +  𝛽𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡 
The dependent variable, Crimect, is the total number of reported crimes for each county in each 
year.   Katrina is the main independent variable of interest, and it measures the migration rate as 
the inflow of Katrina evacuees over the destination county’s population. The vector X contains 
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county economic attributes that affect crime, δ is the parameter vector associated with X, α is the 
intercept, and u is the error term.  The primary coefficient of interest is β, and it is interpreted as 
the change in the number of crimes for counties that experience a 1 percentage point increase in 
the migration rate as result of Hurricane Katrina evacuations. A rapid population increase 
resulting from the inflow of a proportionally large number of economically disadvantaged 
persons would predict β>0.   
The primary objective of this analysis is to obtain consistent estimates of β.  There are, 
however, two possible identification issues.  First, crime and migration may be jointly 
determined.  The migration caused by Hurricane Katrina may increase crime rates, but increased 
crime also may deter migration in spatial equilibrium (Moretti, 2011; Cullen and Levitt, 1999).  
Second, there may be time- and county-varying unobservables, such as economic growth 
expectations, and differences in policing practices across counties that are correlated with crime 
and local migration rates.  
The empirical framework addresses the identification issues in three ways.  First, county 
and yearly fixed effects are added to the specification to remove the time-invariant 
unobservables and any general time effects that affect local crime rates.  Incorporating fixed 
effects, the error term is decomposed as follows   
(8)                                                       𝑢𝑐𝑡 = η𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑣𝑐𝑡 
where η is the county fixed effect, θ is the year fixed effect, and v represents the idiosyncratic 
error.  Second, following the literature that examines the relationship between crime and 
population changes and economic conditions, the specification includes controls for time- and 
county-varying market trends, represented by Xct in the empirical specification (Cullen and 
Levitt, 1999; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001).  Lastly, the analysis relies on the exogenous 
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nature of the in-migration due to the Hurricane Katrina evacuations from New Orleans, discussed 
in Section 2.3, to identify consistent estimates of β.    
   To implement this, the analysis merges data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program collected between 2005 and 2007 (United 
States Department of Justice, 2012) and the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (ACS) 
(Ruggles et al., 2010).  This time frame was chosen for three reasons.  For one, these years 
straddle the occurrence of Hurricane Katrina and subsequent evacuations.  Second, there is an 
empirical link between business cycles and crime (Cook and Zarkin, 1985)6, and this time frame 
is before the onset of the financial crisis and Great Recession. Third, the 2001-2004 ACS 
samples do not include county identifiers.  
 The empirical analysis examines various measures of the dependent variable, Crime, that 
are available in the data.  The FBI’s UCR program’s annual reports include a compilation of 
monthly crime statistics as reported to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies. The UCR 
indexes reported crime incidence into two categories, violent crimes and property crimes.  Data 
on violent crimes include the numbers of murders and non-negligent homicides, forcible rapes, 
aggravated assaults, and robberies.   Property crime statistics include the numbers of arsons, 
burglaries, larceny thefts, and motor vehicle thefts.  Since the data are presented by each 
reporting law enforcement agency and not by municipality, county crime statistics are estimated 
by collapsing the data reported by each county’s sheriff department and the police department of 
the city which serves as each county’s seat.   
The key explanatory variable, Katrina, is constructed from detailed questions in the ACS 
about each household member’s moving status one year prior to the survey date.  Movers are 
                                                          
6 Cook and Zarkin (1985) reported that crime rates related to robbery and burglary increased during a 
recession.   
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also asked to indicate the foreign country, state, city or metropolitan statistical area of residence 
that they resided in before their move. This question facilitates the construction of a variable 
indicating whether the household moved from New Orleans.  A specific reference date for 
migration from New Orleans, however, is not available in the public-use file.  Since ACS data 
are non-overlapping and are collected monthly over the course of a year, this analysis follows the 
assumption used by Passel and Suro (2005).  In particular, data are assumed to be collected at the 
midpoint of the year.  As an example, for the respondent completing the survey at the midpoint 
of the 2006, July 1 would be the survey date.  Respondents that answer “yes” to having lived in 
New Orleans one year prior would have left New Orleans after July 1 of 2005.  The implication 
is that Katrina migrants will appear in both 2005 and 2006 ACS cohorts.  Katrina is measured as 
follows,    
(9)                                        𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡 =
# 𝑁𝑂 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡−1
# 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡−2
× 100,   
where #NO Migrant Households is the number of households that moved from New Orleans one 
year before the survey date in each year, and #Native Households is the number households that 
have no migrants in the survey year. The #Native Household variable is essentially an estimate of 
the stock of households before migrants arrived to the destination counties.  
 Household observations from the ACS were collapsed by county and merged with UCR 
county crime statistics to construct a county-by-year panel of 39 counties in Louisiana and 
bordering states.  Table 1.1 shows the counties that are available in the data and the respective 
Katrina migration rate for each year included in the panel.   
New Orleans household migration rates presented in Table 1.1 demonstrate that the 
average inflow of New Orleans migrants increased by nearly 50% between 2005 and 2006, and it 
fell by nearly twice the level between 2006 and 2007.   Summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that 
51 
 
the average level of total violent crimes decreased each year between 2005 and 2007, and the 
average level of property crimes increased between 2005 and 2006 but fell between 2006 and 
2007.  This table also shows that median nominal incomes increased, and the average 
unemployment rate for the sample decreased within the panel’s time frame.    
 
2.5 Results  
Table 2.2 presents panel estimates of the effect of Katrina migration on the total number 
of violent crimes that are reported each year. The basic theory suggests that 𝛽 is greater than zero 
because an influx of economically disadvantaged persons will lead to increased crime in the local 
area.  In column 1, the fixed effects (FE) estimate of 𝛽, 𝛽 ̂, is equal to 98.03.  This result 
indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the population due to Katrina migration raises the 
number of crimes reported by 98. To address heteroscedasticity in the error term, robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  With a robust standard error equal to 88 however, further 
interpretation of this result suggests that Katrina migration did not have a significant impact on 
violent crime incidences. Column 2 shows the results of the log-level fixed effects specification 
where 𝛽 ̂ is equal to -.012.  The interpretation of this result suggests that 1 percentage point 
increase in the population from Katrina migration decreased violent crime occurrences by 12 
percent.  This result is also not statistically significant from zero.   
Two issues arise from the level and log-level specifications.  First, some counties may not 
have any reported crimes in certain categories such as murder, and in this instance the 
observations would be dropped.  Second, for each crime variable reported in the summary 
statistics in Table 2.1, the respective standard deviation is substantially larger than each 
variable’s mean which may be indicative of over-dispersion.  Therefore, column 3 reports results 
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from the negative binominal fixed effects regression.  The negative binominal regression 
framework is typically used to model count data when there is over dispersion in the outcome 
variable.  In this particular specification, the 𝛽 coefficients are estimated by maximum 
likelihood, hence column 3 also includes the incidence-rate ratio (IRR) which is eβ in brackets. 
The IRR is interpreted as the factor by which the crime level would differ in response to a 1 
percentage point increase in the Katrina migration rate.   The result in column 3 suggests a 
substantially smaller increase in the level of total violent crimes for a 1 percentage-point increase 
in the population due to Katrina migration.  Furthermore, the standard error also indicates that 
this impact is not statistically different from zero.  Columns 4, 5, and 6 repeat the specifications 
in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively, but these include controls for two county- and time-varying 
trends, the unemployment rate and median income.  Quantitatively, the estimates of 𝛽 that 
include the added controls are not substantially different from the respective results in columns 
1, 2, and 3.  Tables 2.3 through 2.6 give the results for the specific classifications of violent 
crimes and are summarized as follows.   
Table 2.3 repeats the fixed effects and negative binominal specifications from Table 2.2, 
except the outcome variable is the number of murders and non-negligent homicides reported for 
the each year.  Column 1 presents the FE estimate of  𝛽 equal to 3 with a robust standard error of 
2.29.  The log-level specification in column 2 suggests that a 1 percentage-point increase in 
Katrina migration increased murder incidence by 5%, and column 3 suggests that a 1 percentage-
point increase in Katrina migration would have increased the level of murders by a factor of 
1.08. The sizeable standard errors again indicate that these results are imprecise.  The level fixed 
effects and negative binominal fixed effects regression results that include added controls in 
columns 4 and 5 are similar in magnitude and interpretation to the results without the added 
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controls.  Interestingly, the log-level specification in column 2 suggests that Katrina migration 
had a negative impact on murders, but this result is also not statistically significant.   
Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on rape.  The results of 
the log-level fixed effects specifications with and without the added controls suggest that a 1 
percentage point increase in Katrina migration increased the number of rapes by approximately 
10 percent.  Furthermore, the robust standard errors reject the null that Katrina migration had no 
impact on rape.  Even though the results from the level fixed effects and the negative binominal 
regressions are also positive these 𝛽 coefficients are not statically different from zero.  
Therefore, the analysis is careful not to draw any definitive conclusions from this result.   
In general, the coefficients and standard errors in Table 2.5 indicate that Katrina 
migration had no impact on aggravated assault. Table 2.6 shows panel estimates of robbery, also 
categorized as a violent crime.  The level fixed effects specifications in columns 1 and 4 suggest 
that migration had a positive impact on robbery while log-level and negative binominal estimates 
suggest that Katrina evacuees negatively impacted robbery incidences.  Regardless, however, in 
all cases neither of these β are different from zero.   
Burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are categorized as property crimes which the 
FBI further describes as crimes to obtain money, property, or some other benefit.  Given that the 
those likely to experience long term displacement in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were 
likely to be economically disadvantaged, this group may also be more predisposed to commit the 
aforementioned property crimes for economic gain.    
Table 2.7 gives estimates of total property crimes.  The log-level fixed effects regression 
results in columns 2 and 5 suggest that 1 percentage-point increase in the population resulting 
from Katrina migration would decrease the total number of property crimes between 3 and 4 
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percent.  Whereas the negative binominal regression coefficients in columns 3 and 6 report that 
when the population increased by 1 percentage point due to Katrina migration the total number 
of property crimes decreased by a factor of .96.  Though, the standard errors the of the β 
estimates across each specification determines that these results are imprecise. Tables 2.8 
through 2.10 report estimates of three classifications of property crimes.   
Analysis of the panel estimates of burglary in Table 2.8 indicate that Katrina migration did 
not cause an increase in burglary.  In fact, the results suggest that Katrina migration decreased 
these occurrences, but these impacts are not statistically different from zero.  Table 2.9 reports 
estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on larceny.  The log-level fixed effect specification 
in column 5 which controls for unemployment and income, suggests that a 1 percentage-point 
increase in the Katrina migration rate caused a 4.5% decline in the larceny.  Interestingly, this 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.  One plausible explanation for the 
decreases in larceny and burglary attributable to Katrina migration could be a consequence of 
changes in policing after the arrival of evacuees to these destination cities.    Table 2.10 reports 
panel estimates of the impact of Katrina migration on motor vehicle theft.  The log-level fixed 
effect specifications in columns 2 and 5 suggest that Katrina migration decreased auto theft, but 
these coefficients are quantitatively small and not different from zero.  The negative binominal 
specification in column 3 suggests that 1 percentage point increase in the Katrina migration 
increased auto theft incidences by a factor of 1.02, but the specification with added controls in 
column 6 suggests that Katrina migration decreased auto theft incidences.  In either case the 
coefficients have relatively large standard errors; hence an impact of Katrina migration is 
indeterminate. 
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In general, with the exception of the analysis of rape, the results complement the finding 
of Varano et al (2010) and support the assertion that the migration of Katrina evacuees into 
various counties throughout Louisiana and its border states of Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas 
did not cause a substantial increase in crime incidences.   
 
2.6 Discussion  
This chapter examined the impact of the mass migration of Hurricane Katrina victims on 
crime in counties throughout the South. A panel of 39 counties was constructed by extracting 
information on crime from the FBI’s UCR database and using ACS data to determine Katrina 
migration rates in evacuee destination counties in Louisiana and its bordering states, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Texas. The analysis found that the migration of hurricane victims did not have a 
significant impact on the local violent crime or property crime levels.  The empirical results in 
this analysis are consistent with existing studies that examine the impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
crime in the evacuee destination cities. Varno et al. (2010) and Leitner and Helbich (2010) 
investigated the impact of Katrina migration in large metropolitan areas that received a 
substantial number of Katrina evacuees, and they also did not find any significant impact.  
In addition to estimating the impact of Katrina on the overall crime, this study also 
examined the impact of Katrina migration on specific types of crimes. Even though Katrina 
migration did not impact violent crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, and robberies, the 
empirical analysis suggested that Katrina migration did have a positive impact on reported rape.  
Though, this analysis is careful not to draw any firm conclusions because this result is not robust 
across specifications. This outcome however does warrant some further discussion and 
investigation.     
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A report from National Public Radio’s Katrina & Beyond series conducted an 
investigative report on rapes and sexual assaults that occurred in make-shift evacuation centers 
including but not limited to the New Orleans Superdome and abandoned schools and apartment 
buildings in New Orleans before the mandated evacuations. Interviewees in the report asserted 
that post-Katrina chaos, which placed vulnerable and predatory persons in close proximity, 
coupled with distressed law enforcement mechanisms, created the perfect environment to 
commit a crime and not report a crime. After hearing numerous accounts of rapes and sexual 
assaults, several rape victims’ advocacy groups launched extensive campaigns to encourage 
Katrina evacuees who were raped or sexually assaulted before evacuating the city to report those 
crimes to local law enforcement officials in their new locations (Burnett, 2005).  This is one 
plausible explanation as to why Katrina migration appears to have a positive and significant 
impact on rapes in the destination counties.     
There is also a dimension in which this study could be expanded and that is to examine 
heterogeneity impacts.  In particular, it is plausible that Katrina evacuees may have been more 
geographically concentrated than at the county level.  Hence, it would be interesting to estimate 
more localized impacts of Katrina migration on crime.  If certain crime statistics are available by 
zip code, that data could be merged with data on Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) claims from Hurricane Katrina, which are available at the zip code level, to examine 
more localized impacts. 
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Table 2.1: Means and Standard Deviations for Crime Variables and Time Varying 
County Trends 
 Variable 2005 2006 2007 
  
Total Violent Crime 
2,209 
(5,455) 
2,196 
(5,550) 
2,120 
(5,352) 
  
Murder 
26 
(70) 
28 
(77) 
27 
(74) 
  
Rape 
127 
(221) 
125 
(222) 
118 
(202) 
  
Robbery  
718 
(2,319) 
744 
(2,400) 
762 
(2,406) 
  
Total Property Crime 
14,451 
(30,624) 
14,219 
(30,656) 
14,616 
(31,904) 
  
Burglary 
3,314 
(7099) 
3,311 
(7,073) 
3,517 
(7,760) 
  
Larceny  
9,525 
(19,221) 
9,187 
(19,015) 
9,718 
(19,690) 
  
Car Theft 
1,612 
(4,586) 
1,721 
(4,795) 
1,682 
(4,689) 
 
Median Household Income (t-1) 
40,691 
(10,802) 
46,732 
(11,503) 
49,590 
(12,120) 
 
Unemployment Rate 
7.37 
(2.36) 
6.51 
(1.82) 
5.45 
(1.51) 
  
Number of Counties 39 39 39 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 2.2: Panel Estimates of Total Violent Crimes using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR 
Data, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Total Violent Crimes 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
98.03 
(88.29) 
 -.012 
(.051) 
.011 
(.037) 
[1.01] 
 
106.93 
(89.19) 
-.002 
(.053) 
.017 
(.038) 
[1.02] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 
  
127.06 
(257.66) 
-.249 
(.257) 
-.027 
(.180) 
[.974] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
  
8.50 
(12.55) 
-.018 
(.015) 
.010 
(.011) 
[1.01] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -426.35   -425.94 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.3: Panel Estimates of Murder using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
 Murder 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
3.00 
(2.92) 
.050 
(.109) 
.069 
(.076) 
[1.07] 
 
2.85 
(3.11) 
-.026 
(.130) 
.074 
(.078) 
[1.08] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
   -1.91 
(5.45) 
-.442 
(.674) 
.114 
(.715) 
[1.12] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   -.146 
(.446) 
-.083 
(.057) 
-.023 
(.029) 
[.978] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -174.64   -174.33 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 109 117 117 109 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 38 39 39 38 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.4: Panel Estimates of Rape using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, Standard 
Errors in Parentheses 
 Rape 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
17.3 
(13.2) 
.106 
(.046) 
.101 
(.063) 
[1.11] 
 
17.67 
(13.69) 
 
.091 
(.052) 
.093 
(.065) 
[1.10] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
   6.40 
(22.96) 
.100 
(.482) 
.098 
(.347) 
[1.10] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   .309 
(1.76) 
-.021 
(.023) 
-.015 
(.017) 
[.985] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -278.39   -278.00 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 115 117 117 115 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.5: Panel Estimates of Aggravated Assault using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR 
Data, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Aggravated Assault 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
72.21 
(73.09) 
-.001 
(.059) 
.018 
(.047) 
[1.02] 
84.00 
(75.34) 
.021 
(.064) 
.033 
(.048) 
[1.03] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
   219.84 
(268.32) 
-.280 
(.300) 
-.018 
(.220) 
[.982] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   10.22 
(14.16) 
.033 
(.020) 
.021 
(.013) 
[1.02] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -413.30   -412.15 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.6: Panel Estimates of Robbery using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Robbery 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
5.49 
(17.45) 
-.050 
(.043) 
-.018 
(.046) 
[.982] 
2.41 
(18.52) 
-.061 
(.057) 
-.037 
(.048) 
[.964] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 
  
-97.28 
(62.07) 
.313 
(.344) 
-.080 
(.251) 
[.923] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
  
-1.88 
(4.17) 
-.021 
(.025) 
-.019 
(.014) 
[.981] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -316.33   -315.33 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 115 117 117 115 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.7: Panel Estimates of Total Property Crimes using 2005-2007ACS Sample and 
UCR Data, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Total Property Crimes 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
-619.92 
(565.92) 
-.031 
(.028) 
-.034 
(.026) 
[.966] 
 
-659.09 
(579.53) 
-.038 
(.028) 
-.043 
(.025) 
[.958] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
   -1,974.9 
(1,071.55) 
-.225 
(.117) 
-.245 
(.091) 
[.783] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   -53.75 
(67.00) 
-.004 
(.007) 
-.004 
(.007)  
[.996] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -555.30   -553.00 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.8: Panel Estimates of Burglary using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Burglary 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
-337.33 
(323.61) 
-.027 
(.037) 
-.033 
(.042) 
[.968] 
-367.92 
(328.17) 
-.031 
(.039) 
-.042 
(.039) 
[.960] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 
  
-851.01 
(408.27) 
-.528 
(.303) 
-.513 
(.172) 
[.600] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
  
-20.92 
(30.38) 
 
.006 
(.014) 
-.007 
(.010) 
[1.01] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -484.15   -479.73 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.9: Panel Estimates of Larceny using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
.   Larceny 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
-384.34 
(314.29) 
-.038 
(.026) 
-.039 
(.027) 
[.961] 
-423.78 
(328.71) 
-.045 
(.026) 
-.047 
(.027) 
[.954] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 
  
-926.72 
(710.21) 
-.147 
(.113) 
-.192 
(.120) 
[.826] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
  
-30.38 
(42.18) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.007) 
[.995] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -525.71   -524.20 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Table 2.10: Panel Estimates of Auto theft using 2005-2007ACS Sample and UCR Data, 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 Auto Theft 
Independent 
Variables 
# Crimes Log Crime # Crimes # Crimes Log Crime # Crimes 
FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
NB-IRR 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
NB-IRR 
(6) 
Katrina HH 
Migration per 100 
101.76 
(70.76) 
-.001 
(.048) 
.017 
(.054) 
[1.02] 
96.61 
(74.53) 
-.020 
(.048) 
-.0004 
(.054) 
[1.00] 
 
Log Median HH 
Income 
 
  
-197.17 
(203.57) 
-.052 
(.389) 
-.140 
(.274) 
[.869] 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
  
-2.45 
(13.04) 
-.023 
(.019) 
-.021 
(.014) 
[.980] 
 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log likelihood   -525.71   -524.20 
       
Number of 
Observations 
117 117 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
Counties 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at 
the county level. Negative binominal specification results also report the incidence rate ratio, 
IRR in [].   
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Chapter 3 
The Impact of Market Concentration in the Market for Senior Rental Housing 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most rapidly growing sectors of the housing market is for senior housing.  
Senior housing is defined as residences that are developed for and occupied by persons over the 
age of 55 and encompasses a growing variety of housing options including aging-in-place 
alternatives like independent living and assisted living residences.  These aging-in-place options 
are marketed as alternatives to co-residence or institutional residences such as nursing homes 
(Sabia, 2008).   
Relatively little is known, however, about the market structure for senior housing.  
Private market senior housing data that was compiled by the American Seniors Housing 
Association indicated that of the 541,105 senior rental housing units owned and operated by the 
top fifty companies, the majority of those units, 64 percent, were owned by only the top ten 
companies (National Real Estate Investor Special Informational Section, 2013).   This suggests 
there might be substantial market power in senior housing, which, by standard microeconomic 
theory, would be associated with higher than competitive market rents and lower occupancy.  
The primary contribution of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between 
ownership concentration and rents and occupancy in the senior rental housing market. The 
analysis uses unique panel data on individual senior housing properties from the National 
Investment Center for Seniors Housing and Care (NIC) to measure ownership concentration and 
to examine its impact on senior housing rents and occupancy measures.  The data contain private 
market senior rental housing details on 13,057 properties in the 100 largest metropolitan areas 
for years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012.  The data also contain average monthly rents, rent growth, 
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absorption rates, and occupancy level information from 100 of the largest U.S. metropolitan 
areas between 2006 and 2012. In this analysis the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is treated 
as the local senior housing rental market and market concentration is estimated using a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  
There are three primary findings.  First, the degree of market concentration varies across 
both metro areas and property types.  In addition to the total market for private senior rental 
housing, three property types are also measured: independent living, assisted living, and skilled 
nursing facilities.    Independent living senior housing markets are more concentrated relative to 
the assisted living and nursing care markets. For example, the independent living housing market 
is concentrated in approximately 60% of the metropolitan areas whereas the assisted living and 
nursing care markets are only concentrated in approximately 13% and 8% of metropolitan areas 
respectively.  Second, fixed-effect panel estimates indicate that higher ownership concentration 
is associated with higher rents and lower occupancy, which is in accordance with the 
contemporary price and concentration empirical literature (Reiss, 1989; Singh and Zhu 2006).  
Third, estimates for separate property types suggest heterogeneity in the impact of market 
concentration on rents and occupancy.  For example, a ten percentage point increase in 
concentration was associated with a 2.3 percent increase in the rental growth rate in the 
independent living market. Increased ownership concentration was also associated with 
increased rents in the assisted living markets.  Finally, not-for-profit ownership status appears to 
dampen the impact of market concentration on rents and occupancy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 includes a description of 
senior housing, a discussion of the basic theoretical framework, and an overview of the 
applicable literature.  Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the regression framework and data 
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respectively.  Section 3.5 lays out the results and Section 3.6 concludes with an overview of the 
analysis and caveats.   
 
3.2 Background  
Historically, the most prevalent senior housing options included remaining in the care of 
family members and loved ones in the seniors’ home, moving in with adult children or family 
members, restricted retirement communities, or nursing homes (Stevenson and Grabowski, 
2010).  As seniors are able to live longer, healthier, more independent lives, and have more 
income and wealth, however, housing trends for seniors include a growing marketplace for more 
aging-in-place alternatives as opposed to institutional residences such as nursing homes.  
The National Investment Center for the Seniors Housing and Care Industry (NIC) 
describes senior housing as housing for people over the age of 55 that includes architectural and 
structural accommodations that older individuals require to live comfortably and moreover 
independently as they continue to age (NIC.org). There are four primary property classifications 
of senior housing; independent living facilities, assisted living facilities, nursing care facilities, 
and memory care facilities.  Each differs according to the ancillary services provided within each 
structure.  Independent living senior housing is generally described as an autonomous housing 
option where some properties may provide light services such as house-keeping and meals.  In 
addition to housing, assisted care living facilities provide some level of health care or nursing to 
residents as well as meals, minor personal care and support, social activities, and supervision.  
Total care nursing homes provide housing, full service meals, transportation, and twenty-four 
hour skilled-nursing care to all of its residents.  Memory care developments provide housing and 
extensive services to residents with dementia conditions like Alzheimer's.  Some senior housing 
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facilities also offer continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs) options that provide a 
variety of services within one geographic space. 
One characteristic of this type of housing is that it appears to have concentrated 
ownership.  The American Seniors Housing Association compiled a list of the nation’s 50 largest 
private seniors’ housing owners of independent living, assisted living, memory care and skilled 
nursing facilities for adults over the age of 55 in June, 2013.  The data indicated that of the 
541,105 units owned by the top fifty companies, 64 percent of those units were owned by ten 
companies (National Real Estate Investor, 2013).  These data did not include subsidized units or 
properties where more than thirty percent of the units were skilled nursing units, and this further 
suggests that there may be some level of ownership concentration in the market for independent 
living and assisted living units.  Entry barriers such as high development costs, the inability of 
smaller firms to obtain capital financing, and scale economies that are present in the general 
rental housing market may be causes of ownership concentration in the senior rental market.   
Economic theory maintains that in a space where competitive market conditions are 
present, the absence of entry barriers drives supply to an efficient level of output where the value 
of the good to the marginal buyer is the same as the cost of producing it.  On the other hand, in 
settings where supply is highly or moderately concentrated, markets conceivably exhibit 
monopolistic properties where prices are higher, quantity is lower, and firms earn higher profits 
by virtue of their market power.  The fundamental cause of market concentration could be 
substantial entry barriers, such as scale economies, capital requirements, product differentiation 
advantages or a combination of the three (Schmalensee, 1989).  
Empirically, little has been written on the economics of senior housing.  Numerous inter-
industry studies have analyzed how market structure impacts market behaviors.  The majority of 
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studies that have examined the relationship between concentration and profitability have found a 
positive relationship, though the effects tended to be small and not statistically robust 
(Schmalensee, 1989).  Other studies have analyzed the impact of concentration on price rather 
than profit.  This empirical literature has the general consensus that higher market concentration 
is associated with higher prices (Weiss, 1989).  
More narrowly, Nyman (1994) examined the relationship between market concentration 
and the price of nursing home care in Wisconsin.  In particular, in that state certificate of need 
laws limit the number of nursing care beds, which generates a barrier to entry.  Nyman found 
that higher market concentration resulted in higher prices of private nursing care, and that for-
profit nursing homes were more likely to have higher prices due to market concentration. 
 
3.3 Empirical Framework 
The literature that analyzes the relationship between ownership concentration and price 
typically begins with a variation of the following structural equation, 
(1)     ln(𝑃𝑚) = 𝛽𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑚 + 𝜹𝑿𝑚 + 𝑢𝑚 .                                                     
The dependent variable, P, is the observed price in market m, MktConm is a measure of market 
concentration, the vector, X contains exogenous cost and demand conditions in each market that 
affect price, δ is the parameter vector associated with X, and u is the error term. The primary 
coefficient of interest is β which measures the impact of market concentration on price.    
In this empirical analysis, the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is treated as the local 
senior housing rental market, and the price measure is the rent in the senior housing market.  
Market concentration is estimated using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  The HHI is 
derived by first calculating the market share, S of each firm competing in a market as follows,  
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(2)         𝑆 =
#𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖
#𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑚
,                                                                                        
where #units is the number of senior rental units owned by firm i, divided by the total number of 
units in firm i’s metropolitan area, m.  The market shares of firms are then squared and summed 
over all the firms in a market to compute the level of concentration in each market as follows,  
(3)       𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                                                                     
The HHI takes into account the relative size distribution of firms competing in each market.  
Hence, the HHI increases as the number of firms decreases and as the disparity in size that exists 
between those firms increases as well.  Therefore, the econometric specification is  
(4)                                             ln(𝑅𝑚𝑡) = 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑚𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝒎𝒕 + 𝑢𝑚𝑡                                                 
where R is the average monthly rent in metropolitan statistical area, m, at time t.  The parameters 
will be estimated by OLS.  In addition, following Evans et al. (1993), Schmalensee (1989), Singh 
and Zhu (2006), and Weiss (1989), the error term is modelled as follows, 
(5)                                         𝑢𝑚𝑡 = 𝑣𝑚 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡 
where vm is an MSA fixed effect that accounts for time-invariant market-specific factors affecting 
rent and concentration, τt is the time effect, and εmt is the idiosyncratic error.  Increased market 
concentration will increase rental rates in the local market interest, hence the predicted value of β 
is greater than zero.  With fixed effects, the estimate of β is identified by within metro area 
changes in ownership concentration across time, which are taken to be exogenous. 
Senior housing projects are built by three general categories of developers, private for 
profits, nonprofits, and the public sector. Data collected by the National Investment Center for 
Seniors Housing and Care between 2007 and 2013 illustrated that the majority of private market 
independent and assisted living senior living facilities, and memory care facilities were owned 
and operated by for-profit entities.  
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The increased presence of nonprofit senior housing developments may then lower rental 
rates in the market for senior units.  By definition nonprofits are mission driven organizations 
that operate to maximize purpose as opposed to profit.  There are numerous advantages of the 
non-profit management and provision of certain goods and human services. As noted by 
O’Regan and Quigley (2000) nonprofit housing groups often help the most vulnerable of 
populations who are neglected by the for-profit sector.   
Therefore, in addition to the specification in (4), the parameters of a second model will be 
estimated,  
(6)       ln(𝑅𝑚𝑡) = 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑚𝑡+ 𝛾1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑡  × 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑚𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑚𝑡 + 𝑢𝑚𝑡 
where ForProfit measures the proportion for-profit units in metro area m, at time t, and ForProfit 
x HHI is an interaction term that captures whether a higher proportion of for-profit units in a 
metro area strengthens the impact of market concentration on rents.  
 
3.4 Data Description 
The analysis uses two data sources on senior rental from the National Investment Center 
for Seniors Housing and Care (NIC) from 100 of the largest U.S. metropolitan areas for even-
numbered years between 2006 and 2012.  NIC is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to 
“advance the quality and availability of seniors housing and care options for America's elders 
through research, education and increased transparency that facilitate informed investment 
decisions, quality outcomes and leadership development in seniors housing and care” (NIC.org). 
The first data source contains private market senior rental housing details on 13,057 properties, 
including the name of the property, owner, address, metropolitan area, profit status, property 
classification type, number of units, and number of units by type for each property.  The second 
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data source contains average monthly rents, rent growth, absorption rates, and occupancy level 
information at the metropolitan level.  NIC categorizes metro areas into two classes, primary and 
secondary markets.  Primary senior housing markets entail the 31 largest metro areas whereas the 
remaining 69 are considered secondary markets. Table 3.1 lists the metropolitan areas used in 
this study.7  
The four property classifications of senior housing in the NIC data are independent living 
communities (IL), assisted living residences (AL), skilled nursing care facilities (NC), and 
memory care facilities (MC) The distinguishing factor between the different types of senior 
housing is the level of services provided. For example, IL communities are multifamily rental 
housing developments, available to residents over the age of 55, which offer light services such 
as dining facilities, light housekeeping, and organized social and recreational activities.  Assisted 
living residences offer the same services as IL communities, and in addition, these residences 
have skilled nursing staff to assist residents who require assistance with a range of activities for 
daily living.  Additional AL services include tasks like helping residents bathe, dress, and 
administering medications. Some AL residences may also be regulated by state agencies 
depending on the level of services (Stevenson et al, 2010).   Skilled nursing care facilities 
provide skilled nursing care to all of their residents on a 24 hour basis.8    Memory care (MC) 
refers to those institutions that only specialize in the care of residents with Alzheimer’s and 
various forms of dementia (NIC.org).   
                                                          
7 Data are only available for the 31 largest metropolitan areas for the 2006 wave.  These metropolitan 
areas are also identified in Table 3.1.  
 
8 Entry into the nursing care market is also regulated in 36 states by certificate of need (CON) laws.  The 
goal of CON laws is to control health care costs by coordinating the level of supply.  Approval of new NC 
developments and expansions require the demonstration of critical needs not being fulfilled by existing 
servicers (National Conference of State Legislatures)  
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 The data are collapsed to construct a metropolitan area panel data set of market supply 
information. Data on the number of units and the number units by property type facilitate the 
calculation of metro level HHI’s for all four senior structure types as well as metro level HHI’s 
based on unit type. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division evaluates market concentration 
as follows,   
 HHI > 0.18  Concentrated 
 0.1 ≤ HHI ≤ 0.18 Moderate Concentration 
 0.01 ≤ HHI < 0.1   Unconcentrated 
 HHI < 0.01  Competitive. 
Table 3.2 summarizes ownership concentration in the 100 metropolitan areas and the 
respective average monthly rent (AMR) for each of the four levels of concentration.  The data 
suggest that the markets for all senior housing types were relatively competitive across all four 
waves (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012).   The IL, AL, and NC markets however show more 
variability in ownership concentration and changes over time. Furthermore, the analysis in Table 
3.2 indicates that more than half of the IL markets were moderately and very concentrated, 
whereas AL and NC markets were mostly unconcentrated and competitive across all four 
periods.  In the AL markets, median rents are higher when there is more concentration, but 
median rents in the IL and NC markets were slightly lower in concentrated markets.   
Table 3.3 gives the same information as Table 3.2 but for the 31 primary metropolitan 
areas.  The market for senior housing is more competitive in larger cities across the four property 
classifications.  Table 3.4 describes ownership structure and median rent growth across property 
classifications.  The median rent growth in concentrated IL and NC markets tended to be higher 
when compared to unconcentrated IL and NC markets.    
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Concentration impacts were assessed using five different dependent variables, average 
monthly rents, average monthly rent growth, absorption, the change in mean annual absorption, 
and stabilized occupancy rates for each metro area. Absorption is the change in occupied units 
from the previous quarter, and the annual average changes were calculated for each metro area 
based on the provided quarterly reports.  Stabilized occupancy rates measured the occupancy of 
properties that had been opened for at least two years, and the occupancy for properties open less 
than 2 years was only included as stable if those properties had reached occupancy of at least 
95% since their opening.  Table 3.5 gives the summary statistics for the aforementioned outcome 
variables, market concentration measured as a HHI, and the proportion of for-profits units in the 
markets for all senior housing. Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 give those summary statistics for the IL, 
AL, and NC markets respectively.  The mean rent for all housing types increased between each 
period, and these increases were largest in the markets for IL units.  Assisted living rents 
decreased between the 2006 and 2008 waves but increased between 2008 and 2010 and between 
2010 and 2012.  The largest rents were in the AL markets whereas the lowest rents were in the 
skilled nursing care segment.  Even though NC’s provide a wider and more complex range of 
services, it is reasonable to assume that these price differences are likely due to the high level of 
Medicare subsidization that such facilities receive.  
Across each time period, mean rental growth rates were declining in the market for all 
senior housing, fluctuating in the IL market, but declining in the AL and NC markets.  
Absorption was greatest in the IL markets, and it was also increasing across each period with the 
exception of a decrease between the 2006 and 2008 waves.  The larger share, about 75%, of for-
profit senior housing installments were in the AL and NC markets.  The mean proportion of for- 
profit IL markets was approximately 60%. There was also relatively little to no change in the 
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proportion of for-profit senior housing establishments across the four waves. Figures 3.1 through 
3.4 show histograms, which illustrate that, across the 3 different senior housing types, rents, were 
more normally distributed in the unconcentrated markets.   
 
3.5 Results 
This section presents pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) 
regressions results of the model discussed in Section 3.3.  Separate results are reported for the 
overall senior housing market, independent living (IL), assisted living (AL), and skilled nursing 
care markets (NC) in Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 respectively.  Concentration and profit 
status impacts in each market are measured using five different dependent variables: log mean 
monthly rents, annual rental growth rates, absorption, absorption growth and stabilized 
occupancy rates.  Each table presents four sets of results for each dependent variable.  Column 1 
uses pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and column 2 uses fixed effect (FE) to estimate the 
impact of ownership concentration on the dependent variables.  Columns 3 and 4 repeat columns 
1 and 2 respectively but also include the proportion of for-profit senior housing developments 
and an interaction variable of the HHI and proportion of for-profit units.    
3.5.1 All Senior Housing  
Table 3.9 presents panel estimates of the impact of ownership concentration in all senior 
housing markets.  In column 1, the pooled OLS estimate of β, is equal to 1.892.  This result 
suggests that a 100 percent increase in the HHI, would decrease market area rents by 189 
percent.  Column 2 shows the fixed effects estimate of the impact of ownership concentration on 
monthly rents. Even though the estimate is positive, as expected, the coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero.  Columns 3 and 4 use the same specification as in columns 1 and 
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2, respectively, but it includes controls for the proportion of for-profit units in each market and 
the interaction term.  These estimates suggest that there are negative correlations between 
ownership concentration and MSA rents and between the proportion of for-profits and rents.  
The point estimates from these specifications however are not statistically different from zero.   
  The following set of results in Table 3.9, report estimates the impact of ownership 
concentration on rent growth.   Pooled ordinary least squares results suggest that a 100 percent 
increase in the HHI causes a 15 percent decrease in rental growth rates.  The FE estimate in 
column 2 suggests that a 100 percent increase in the ownership concentration causes a 63 percent 
increase in rental growth rates.  The estimates of rental growth in columns 3 and 4 vary 
substantially, and these results are not statistically different from zero.  The specifications that 
estimate the impact of market concentration on absorption suggest that ownership concentration 
has a negative impact on absorption and the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% 
level in models that only include the HHI independent variable. Ordinary least squares 
standardized coefficients show that an increase of 1 standard deviation (.0163) in the Herfindahl 
index, would decrease absorption by an average of 14 units over the course of a year, and FE 
results indicate a decrease of 48 units over the course of a year.   
Absorption growth coefficients differ in size and in the direction of the impact, however, 
and these estimates are not different from zero across all four specifications.  Fixed effects 
results of stabilized occupancy in column 2 suggest that a 100% increase in HHI, increases the 
stabilized occupancy rate by 92% and this result is significant at the 5% significance level.  In 
addition, the FE specification with interactions in column 4 also suggests that an increased 
proportion of for-profits enhances the effect of ownership concentration on stabilized occupancy.   
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The results of the all senior housing market analysis vary in terms of the direction and 
magnitude of the estimated impacts of market concentration and profit status across the various 
specifications.   Recognizing that the different types of senior housing vary according to payment 
mechanisms, regulatory measures, and the level of services provided, the following sections 
separately analyze the impact of the market concentration and profit status in the various types of 
senior housing.9   
3.5.2 Independent Living  
Table 3.10 repeats the specifications presented in Table 3.9 but for the independent living 
senior housing markets. The OLS result in column 1 suggests that a 100 percent increase in the 
HHI of independent living markets, decreases rents by 42 percent.  The estimated value of β 
from the fixed effects specification in column 2 suggests that a 100 percent increase in the 
independent living HHI, decreases average monthly rents by 124 percent.  The OLS and FE 
specifications, in columns 3 and 4 respectively, yield quantitatively similar results from the fixed 
effects result in column 2.  Even though significance varies across specifications, the direction of 
the impact is consistently negative.  The average monthly rent regressions show a positive 
relation between the proportion of for-profit units and rents.   
In terms of rent growth, the HHI-IL follows the expected sign, and is statistically 
different from zero at the 5 percent level in the FE specification presented in column 2.  A 100% 
increase in the HHI increases rental growth rates by 23 percent.  The FE specification in column 
4, which also controls for the proportion of for-profit units and the interaction of for-profit units 
and ownership concentration is quantitatively similar to the previous result though it is less 
                                                          
9 Metropolitan level rent and absorption data are unavailable for memory care units, therefore those are 
not included in the analysis.    
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precise.  Pooled OLS and FE results also indicate that an increase in the proportion of for-profit 
units increases the impact that the HHI has on rental growth rates.   
The next set of results in Table 3.10 includes an analysis of the effect of ownership 
concentration on absorption.  Increased market concentration decreases absorption in the market 
for IL senior units similar to the overall market.  Ordinary least squares standardized coefficients, 
based on the result in column, show that an increase of 1 standard deviation (.0723) in the HHI-
IL, would decrease absorption by an average of 11 units over the course of a year.  The fixed 
effects result in column 2 indicates a decrease of 26 units over the course of a year. The 
absorption coefficients from the OLS and FE specifications that control for the proportion of for-
profit units and the interaction term are also consistently negative though not statistically 
different from zero at an acceptable significance level.   
The following section of Table 3.10 shows results from regressions that examine the 
impact of ownership concentration on absorption growth. The ordinary least squares result in 
column 1 suggests that increased concentration decreases absorption growth, and FE results in 
column 2 show the same direction of impact, but the results differ in magnitude.  Interestingly, 
FE regressions with interactions reverse the direction of the impact, and an increase in the 
proportion of for-profits increases absorption growth.  The interaction of HHI-IL with the for-
profit variable is also significant at the 5% level, and it is negative.  The estimates of absorption 
growth as measured by the specification in column 4 may imply that in the IL market 
concentration is prevalent amongst the non-profit segment and that more for-profit units weakens 
the impact that concentration has on absorption growth.        
The last section of regression results reported in Table 3.10 provides estimates of the 
impact of ownership concentration on stabilized occupancy.  Ordinary least squares results in 
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columns 1 and 3 suggest that increased ownership concentration decreases stabilized occupancy 
rates, whereas FE results in columns 2 and 4 suggest that increased ownership concentration 
increases stabilized occupancy.  Also, the OLS regression in column 4, with interactions show 
that the increased presence of for-profit owners along with increased concentration decreases 
stabilized occupancy, and that increased for-profit developers strengthens the negative impact of 
increased concentration on stabilized occupancy.  The FE estimates in column 4, however differ 
in terms of the direction on the impact, and the results are not statistically different from zero.   
3.5.3 Assisted Living 
Table 3.11 gives panel estimates of average monthly rents, rent growth, absorption, 
absorption growth and stabilized occupancy for assisted living senior housing across the metro 
markets included in the data.   Fixed effects regression results in column 2 show that a 100 
percent increase in the assisted living HHI increases average monthly rents by 57 percent.  This 
result is statistically different from zero at a l% significance level.   
Estimates of rent growth in AL markets however vary across the specifications. The OLS 
specification in column 1 suggests a negative correlation between concentration and rent growth, 
whereas the OLS specification with added controls in column 3 shows a positive correlation 
between concentration and rent growth.  Furthermore, the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant which implies that an increase the proportion of for-profit units weakens 
the impact of concentration on area rent growth.      
Standardized coefficients from the ordinary least squares estimate of absorption in 
column 1 show that an increase of 1 standard deviation (.0538) in the HHI-AL decreases 
absorption by an average of 3 units over the course of a year.  Fixed effects results in column 4 
indicate a decrease of 93 units over the course of a year.  Interestingly, the negative and 
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statistically significant interaction coefficient from the specification in column 4 suggests that 
more for-profit ownership strengthens the negative impact that increased concentration has on 
absorption.  This could also imply that increased non-profits could attenuate the negative impact 
that concentration has on absorption.      
The next set of results in Table 3.11 estimate ownership concentration impacts on 
absorption growth.  These estimates are consistently positive across all four specifications.  The 
point estimates, however differ substantially in magnitude.  The results that estimate the impact 
of ownership concentration on stabilized occupancy suggest that an increase in the concentration 
decreases stabilized occupancy.  The OLS and FE specifications with added controls in columns 
3 and 4 respectively, however, suggest that increased concentration increases stabilized 
occupancy rates.  In addition, the interaction terms in both specifications are also negative and 
statistically significant.  This also implies that an increase in the proportion of for-profits 
weakens the impact of concentration, as measured by the HHI.     
3.5.4 Nursing Care 
Table 3.12 gives panel estimates of the MSA average monthly rent, rent growth, 
absorption, absorption growth, and stabilized occupancy for nursing care housing markets. The 
direction of impact across the OLS and FE specifications varies.  The OLS parameter estimates 
in columns 1 and 3 indicate a positive correlation between MSA average monthly rents and the 
nursing care Herfindahl index, whereas the FE estimates in columns 2 and 4 suggest that an 
increase in ownership concentration has a positive impact on rents in the nursing care market.  
Furthermore, the ordinary least squares standard errors, and the fixed effects robust standard 
errors determine that these coefficients are not precisely estimated. The OLS specification in 
column 2 also suggests that there is a negative correlation between the proportion of for-profit 
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nursing care units and the monthly rents of these units.  The FE specification however shows that 
the impact of for-profits is in the opposite direction, but this estimate is unreliable.  The direction 
of impact of the interaction variable also varies.   
Estimates of the impact of ownership concentration on absorption and absorption growth 
are provided in Table 3.12 as well. These coefficient estimates also vary widely in magnitude.  
The OLS standardized coefficients from column 1 suggest that an increase of 1 standard 
deviation (.0324) in HHI-NC, would decrease absorption by an average of 10 units over the 
course of a year, and the OLS specification in column 3 indicates an increase in absorption of 58 
units of the course of a year.  An increase in the proportion of for-profit units also has positive 
and marginally significant impact on absorption.  Results from the FE specification in column 4 
however suggests the exact opposite impact, and the sizeable standard errors indicate that these 
results cannot be used to draw any meaningful implications.   
The following section in Table 3.12 reports absorption growth results.  Across the four 
specifications, these results show that the impact of concentration on absorption growth is 
negative, though the estimates vary substantially in magnitude. The OLS and FE specifications 
in columns 3 and 4, respectively, suggest that an increase in the proportion of for-profit 
ownership enhances the concentration impacts of concentration on absorption growth.   
The last section in Table 3.12 shows stabilized occupancy results.  The FE specification in 
column 4 that includes the for-profit and interaction variables, suggests that a 100 percent 
increase in the nursing care HHI decreases stabilized occupancy by more than 200%.  The OLS 
and FE specifications with added controls for for-profit units also suggests that an increased 
proportion of for-profits decreases stabilized occupancy rates of the nursing care units.  
Interestingly, the interaction of concentration and profit status however is marginally significant 
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and the positive sign of the coefficient suggests that an increased proportion of for-profits 
increases the adverse impact that ownership concentration has on stabilized occupancy in the 
nursing care markets.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This study utilized MSA panel data on the supply of private senior rental housing to 
measure ownership concentration, using a Herfindahl Index (HHI), and to estimate the impacts 
of concentration on market level rents and occupancy variables. This is, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first analysis of the impact of ownership concentration in the senior housing 
market. 
There are a number of findings.  First, when aggregated together, the market for all senior 
housing options is not concentrated.  Analysis by property classification, however, revealed that 
the independent living senior housing market was relatively concentrated and that there was 
more competition in the assisted living and nursing care markets.  Pooled ordinary least squares 
and fixed effects regressions were implemented to assess the impact of ownership concentration 
on metropolitan monthly rents and occupancy measures.  Ownership concentration, as measured 
by the Herfindahl Index, had significant impacts on rents in the IL and AL housing markets. A 
100% percent increase in the HHI increased assisted living rents by 57 percent.  
The study also examined whether the profit status and an interaction of concentration and 
profit status of the housing properties had an observable impact on MSA rents and/or rent 
growth.  Results implied a positive correspondence between the proportion of for-profits and 
rents and that an increase in the proportion of for-profits enhanced the impact that concentration 
has on rent growth in the IL markets.  The results varied in other property types.    
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There are a number of caveats to this study.  First, the data only covers a relatively short 
time period, so that the estimates should be thought of as short-run in nature.  Entry in the longer 
run may dissipate any effects of concentration measured here.  Second, the period of study 
included when the economy was in the midst of a severe recession that had substantial impacts 
on the housing market. Finally, the analysis was not able to pin down the economic mechanism 
for market power in the independent and assisted living markets and further unraveling the 
nature of these entry barriers is an important area for new research.   
An interesting extension of the analysis would be to explore the utilization of Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) to finance the development of these types of structures.  
LIHTCs are awarded by states on a competitive basis and in accordance with each state’s 
housing priorities.  Developers often build senior living residences as a way of scoring additional 
points on tax credit applications particularly when state agencies make senior housing a priority.  
Once tax credits are awarded, nearly all developers use a syndicator to sell the tax credits to 
investors in exchange for upfront capital as opposed to realizing the credits in incremental 
amounts (10%) over 10 years.   LIHTC regulations also require that a partnering ownership 
structure be formed between the developers, investors, and syndicators of the project.  Typically, 
a Limited Partnership or a Limited Liability Partnership is formed where the creditor/investor 
has a 99% ownership stake in the project.  Given that tax credits are nonrefundable, it is implied 
that the investors purchasing the credits and assuming ownership of the project have sufficient 
federal income tax liability, and that they have the capacity to assume the responsibilities and 
risks associated with ownership of the properties (Eriksen 2009).  The amount of capital required 
to participate in these secondary market transactions which also determine the ownership of the 
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properties could be an entry barrier in the independent and assisted living markets.  This is an 
important avenue for future research.    
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Table 3.1: 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Available in NIC Data 
*Indicates 31 Large Metropolitan Areas-Primary Markets 
  
 
*Atlanta, GA *San Jose, CA Des Moines, IA New Orleans, LA 
*Baltimore, MD *Seattle, WA El Paso, TX Ogden, UT 
*Boston, MA *St. Louis, MO Fort Myers, FL Oklahoma City, OK 
*Chicago, IL *Tampa, FL Fresno, CA Omaha, NE 
*Cincinnati, OH *Washington, DC Grand Rapids, MI Portland, ME 
*Cleveland, OH Akron, OH Greensboro, NC Poughkeepsie, NY 
*Dallas, TX Albany, NY Greenville, SC Providence, RI 
*Denver, CO Albuquerque, NM Harrisburg, PA Raleigh, NC 
*Detroit, MI Allentown, PA Hartford, CT Richmond, VA 
*Houston, TX Augusta, GA Indianapolis, IN Rochester, NY 
*Kansas City, MO Austin, TX Jackson, MS Salt Lake City, UT 
*Las Vegas, NV Bakersfield, CA Jacksonville, FL San Francisco, CA 
*Los Angeles, CA Baton Rouge, LA Knoxville, TN Sarasota, FL 
*Miami, FL Birmingham, AL Lakeland, FL Scranton, PA 
*Minneapolis, MN Boise, ID Lancaster, PA Springfield, MA 
*New York, NY Bridgeport, CT Little Rock, AR Stockton, CA 
*Orlando, FL Buffalo, NY Louisville, KY Syracuse, NY 
*Philadelphia, PA Charleston, SC Madison, WI Toledo, OH 
*Phoenix, AZ Charlotte, NC McAllen, TX Tucson, AZ 
*Pittsburgh, PA Chattanooga, TN Melbourne, FL Tulsa, OK 
*Portland, OR Colorado Springs, CO Memphis, TN Ventura, CA 
*Riverside, CA Columbia, SC Milwaukee, WI Virginia Beach, VA 
*Sacramento, CA Columbus, OH Modesto, CA Wichita, KS 
*San Antonio, TX Dayton, OH Nashville, TN Worcester, MA 
*San Diego, CA Daytona Beach, FL New Haven, CT Youngstown, OH 
*San Francisco, CA 
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Table 3.2: Median MSA Average Monthly Rents by Market Structure and Year 
  MSA Average Monthly Rents 
 
 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Market Structure 
 
N AMR N AMR N AMR N AMR 
All Senior Housing  
1 
 
3293 
() 1 
3592 
() 1 
3824 
() 1 
3939 
() 
Competitive 
Un-concentrated   
30 
2550 
(363) 
 
99 
2705 
(397) 
 
98 
2822 
(433) 
 
99 
2912 
(456) 
Moderate Concentration  
- - - - 
1 
2809 
() 
- - 
Concentrated 
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Independent Living  
Competitive 
  
- - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated 
 23 
2367 
(371) 39 
2464 
(409) 45 
2570 
(412) 43 
2694 
(429) 
Moderate Concentration 
 7 
2087 
(452) 42 
2350 
(521) 39 
2471 
(589) 41 
2562 
(588) 
Concentrated 
 1 
2039 
() 19 
2281 
(426) 16 
2314 
(436) 16 
2430 
(417) 
Assisted Living  
Competitive 
  
 - - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated  30 3142   
(488) 
86 3152  
(431) 
90 3294  
(488) 
84 3364  
(487) 
Moderate Concentration   1 4210         
() 
11 3222  
(732) 
7 3045  
(463) 
13 3289  
(667) 
Concentrated   - - 3 3135  
(791) 
3 3437  
(1150) 
3 3448  
(1241) 
 
Nursing Care 
 
Competitive 
 1 
315        
() 1 
339       
() 1 
357      
() 1 
376      
() 
Un-concentrated 
 30 
206  
(206) 91 
221  
(48) 91 
237  
(52) 91 
248  
(56) 
Moderate Concentration 
 
- - 
8 
196  
(30) 7 
208  
(35) 6 
230  
(44) 
Concentrated 
 
 
- - - - 
1 216      
() 
2 213  
(19) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis  
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Table 3.3: Median MSA Average Monthly Rents by Market Structure                                           
and Year for Primary Markets 
  MSA Average Monthly Rents 
 
 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Market Structure 
 
N AMR N AMR N AMR N AMR 
All Senior Housing 
 
 
1 
 
3293 
() 
 
1 
 
3592 
() 
 
1 
 
3824 
() 
 
1 
 
3939 
() 
Competitive 
Un-concentrated  
30 
2550 
(363) 30 
2769 
(372) 30 
2914 
(372) 30 
2996 
(393) 
Moderate Concentration 
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Concentrated 
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Independent Living  
Competitive 
  
- - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated 
 23 
2367 
(371) 23 
2547 
(403) 26 
2676 
(415) 25 
2797 
(438) 
Moderate Concentration 
 7 
2087 
(452) 7 
2300 
(324) 4 
2572 
(370) 5 
2649 
(351) 
Concentrated 
 1 
2039 
() 1 
2379 
() 1 
2608 
() 1 
2719 
() 
 
Assisted Living  
Competitive  
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated  
30 
3142 
(487) 29 
3375 
(473) 31 
3473 
(545) 30 
3525 
(562) 
Moderate Concentration   
1 
4210 
() 2 
3650 
(1154) - - 1 
2785 
() 
Concentrated  
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Nursing Care  
Competitive 
 1 
315  
() 1 
338  
() 1 
357 
 () 1 
376 
 () 
Un-concentrated 
 30 
206 
(35) 30 
224 
(39) 30 
241 
(42) 30 
250 
(45) 
Moderate Concentration 
  
- - - - - - - - 
Concentrated 
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis  
90 
 
Table 3.4: Median MSA Rental Growth Rates by Market Structure and Year  
  MSA Rent Growth 
 
 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Market Structure 
 
N 
Rent 
Growth N 
Rent 
Growth N 
Rent 
Growth N 
Rent 
Growth 
All Senior Housing 
 
 
1 
 
.053        
() 
 
1 
 
.034         
() 
 
1 
 
.024        
() 
 
1 
 
.001         
() Competitive 
Un-concentrated 
 
29 
.037 
(.008) 31 
.033  
(.008) 98 
.016 
(.011) 99 
.018  
(.011) 
 
Moderate Concentration 
 
- - - - 1 
.028        
() - - 
 
Concentrated 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Independent Living  
Competitive 
  
- - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated 
 
23 .034  
(.012) 
23 .036  
(.013 
45 .016  
(.011) 
43 .023  
(.012) 
Moderate Concentration 
 
6 .038  
(.013) 
7 .027 
(.008) 
39 .017 
(.017) 
41 .024 
(.015) 
Concentrated 
 
1 .066          
() 
1 .042         
() 
16 .028  
(.025) 
16 .012  
(.017) 
 
Assisted Living  
Competitive  
 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Un-concentrated  
29 
.040  
(.011) 29 
.029  
(.009) 90 
.014   
(.013) 84 
.010  
(.017) 
Moderate Concentration   
1 
.028          
() 2 
.044  
(.017) 7 
-.004  
(.025) 13 
.014  
(.018) 
Concentrated   
- - - - 3 
.025   
(.041) 3 
-.004  
(.041) 
 
Nursing Care  
Competitive 
 1 
.037       
() 1 
.039       
() 1 
.025         
() 1 
.030          
() 
Un-concentrated 
 29 
.045 
(.011) 30 
.041 
(.009) 91 
.033  
(.009) 91 
.031  
(.012) 
Moderate Concentration 
 - - - - 7 
.032 
(.008) 6 
.033  
(.017) 
Concentrated 
 
 
- - - - 1 
.027         
() 
2 
.041          
() 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  Rent growth data for years 2006 and 2008 are only 
available for the 31 largest metro areas. Las Vegas, NV is missing rent growth information for 2006.    
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Table 3.5:  All Senior Housing  
Means and Standard Deviations for MSA Rents, Rent Growth Rates, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, Stabilized Occupancy, Ownership Concentration, and the Proportion 
of For-Profits  
 
Variable  2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Average Monthly Rent 
 
2574.94 
(381.04) 
 
2713.69 
(405.31) 
 
2832.12 
(440.36) 
 
2922.34 
(405.31) 
Rent Growth .0373  
(.0086) 
.0328  
(.0079) 
.0158  
(.0111) 
.0178  
(.0079) 
Absorption 62.81 
 (68.12) 
7.65  
(50.95) 
29.48 
 (43.41) 
27.86  
(50.95) 
Absorption Growth 
- 
-1.21 
 (4.65) 
18.31 
 (184.30) 
-2.05  
(4.65) 
Stabilized Occupancy .922  
(.026) 
.9094  
(.0295) 
.893 
 (.267) 
.900  
(.0295) 
HHI .0240  
(.0088) 
.0369 
 (.0165) 
.03656  
(.0168) 
.0371  
(.0165) 
Proportion For Profit .70  
(.11) 
.71 
 (.12) 
.71  
(.12) 
.71 
 (.12) 
 
Number of MSAs 31 100 100 100 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.   
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Table 3.6:  Independent Living   
Means and Standard Deviations for MSA Rents, Rent Growth Rates, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, Stabilized Occupancy, Ownership Concentration, and the Proportion 
of For-Profits  
 
Variable  2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Average Monthly Rent 
 
2293.70 
(397.68) 
 
2382.63 
(464.21) 
 
2490.46 
(495.28) 
 
2597.96 
(503.08) 
Rent Growth .0331  
(.0129) 
.0346  
(.0120) 
.0185  
(.0165) 
.0229  
(.0141) 
Absorption 41.93 
 (49.95) 
6.83  
(39.42) 
16.60 
 (32.45) 
20.70 
 (52.12) 
Absorption Growth - -.955 
 (6.85) 
-1.19 
 (18.38) 
1.39 
 (15.49) 
Stabilized Occupancy .928 
 (.043) 
.9083 
 (.08175) 
.884  
(.050) 
.896  
(.043) 
HHI .0756 
 (.0393) 
.1286 
 (.0752) 
.1236 
 (.07414) 
.1241 
 (.0713) 
Proportion For Profit .55 
 (.19) 
.58 
 (.1886) 
.58  
(.1798) 
.58 
 (.1786) 
 
Number of MSAs 31 100 100 100 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.   
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Table 3.7:  Assisted Living   
Means and Standard Deviations for MSA Rents, Rent Growth Rates, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, Stabilized Occupancy, Ownership Concentration, and the Proportion 
of For-Profits  
 
Variable  2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Average Monthly Rent 
 
3177  
(516.42) 
 
3159.43 
(476.18) 
 
3281.19 
(509.15) 
 
3356.41 
(533.87) 
Rent Growth .0397  
(.0109) 
.0297  
(.001) 
.0126 
 (.0157) 
.0104 
 (.0178) 
Absorption 22.15 
 (35.48) 
.775  
(23.73) 
13.39 
 (23.71) 
7.4 
 (33.49) 
Absorption Growth - .0728  
(4.41) 
-.5681  
(9.35) 
-2.8 
 (11.50) 
Stabilized Occupancy .910 
 (.0256) 
.9012 
 (.0369) 
.8984 
 (.0297) 
.9039 
 (.0284) 
HHI .0205 
 (.0218) 
.0714 
 (.0540) 
.0686 
 (.0523) 
.0732 
 (.0604) 
Proportion For Profit .75 
 (.12) 
.77  
(.12) 
.77 
 (.12) 
.77 
 (.12) 
 
Number of MSAs 31 100 100 100 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.   
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Table 3.8:  Nursing Care 
Means and Standard Deviations for MSA Rents, Rent Growth Rates, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, Stabilized Occupancy, Ownership Concentration, and the Proportion 
of For-Profits  
 
Variable  2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Average Monthly Rent 
 
209.14  
(40.03) 
 
219.88 
 (48.81) 
 
236.18 
 (52.62) 
 
247.85 
 (56.45) 
Rent Growth .044 
 (.011) 
.041 
 (0089) 
.0326 
 (.0092) 
.0316 
 (.0124) 
Absorption -19.37  
(66.44) 
-27.28 
 (44.57) 
-10.46 
 (31.67) 
-3.38  
(71.49) 
Absorption Growth  -2.36 
 (22.88) 
-2.33 
 (11.12) 
.1512 
 (16.96) 
Stabilized Occupancy .900 
 (.041) 
.90  
(.0482) 
 .8869 
 (.0515) 
.8815 
 (.0525) 
HHI .0168  
(.006) 
.0582 
 (.0311) 
.0587 
 (.0339)  
.0593 
 (.0342) 
Proportion For Profit .74 
 (.12) 
.73 
 ( .1364) 
 .73 
 (.1352) 
.73 
 (.13) 
 
Number of MSAs 31 100 100 100 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.   
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Figure 3.3  
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Table 3.9: Panel Estimates of MSA Average Monthly Rent, Rent Growth, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, and Stabilized Occupancy for All Senior Housing, Standard Errors in 
Parenthesis  
 Log Average Monthly Rent 
Independent Variables  (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
 
HHI 
-1.892* 
(.950) 
.056 
(1.54) 
-7.671 
(4.56) 
-2.46 
(7.17) 
 
Proportion For-Profit 
  -.135 
(.269) 
-.259 
(.641) 
HHI x For Profit 
    8.31 
(6.19) 
3.62 
(10.24) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Rent Growth 
 
HHI 
-.152*** 
(.042) 
.630 
(.382) 
-.072 
(.161) 
-1.56 
(1.39) 
 
Proportion For-Profit 
  -.005 
(.010) 
.103 
(.159) 
HHI x For Profit 
  -.116 
(.227) 
3.34 
(2.04) 
Number of Observations 261 261 261 261 
 Absorption 
 
HHI 
-863.89** 
(283.84) 
-2941.22** 
(1007.28) 
1877.12 
(1862.55) 
-345.67 
(5971.28) 
 
Proportion For-Profit 
  -95.68 
(146.76) 
262.85 
(543.14) 
HHI x For Profit 
  1464.66 
(2781.02) 
-3731.42 
(7914.75) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Absorption Growth 
 
HHI 
295.43 
(320.31) 
-797.10 
(1205.22) 
-104.53 
(504.10) 
1653.94 
(1329.93) 
 
Proportion For-Profit 
  14.15 
(23.55) 
835.26 
(830.30) 
HHI x For Profit 
  578.85 
(1053.32) 
-3449.68 
(2573.73) 
Number of Observations 230 230 230 230 
 Stabilized Occupancy 
 
HHI 
.005 
(.178) 
.923** 
(.459) 
.448 
(.510) 
-2.86 
(2.20) 
 
Proportion For-Profit 
  -.061 
(.037) 
.132 
(.207) 
HHI x For Profit 
  -.628 
(.780) 
5.36* 
(3.17) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
*Significant at 10% Level. **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3.10: Panel Estimates of MSA Average Monthly Rent, Rent Growth, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, and Stabilized Occupancy for Independent Living Senior Housing, 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis  
 Log Average Monthly Rent 
Independent Variables  (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
 
HHI-IL 
-.420* 
(.244) 
-1.24** 
(.399) 
-.992 
(.763) 
-1.19 
(1.32) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-IL 
  .075 
(.190) 
.336 
(.356) 
HHI-IL x For Profit-IL 
  .854 
(1.103) 
-.179 
(1.49) 
Number of Observations 330 330 330 330 
 Rent Growth 
 
HHI-IL 
-.012 
(.024) 
.232** 
(.094) 
-.104 
(.064) 
.195 
(.339) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-IL 
  -.017 
(.011) 
.089 
(.077) 
HHI-IL x For Profit-IL 
  .155* 
(.085) 
.077 
(.380) 
Number of Observations 261 261 261 261 
 Absorption 
 
HHI-IL 
-148.47** 
(44.66) 
-363.88** 
(160.52) 
-269.23 
(169.79) 
-387.05 
(414.57) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-IL 
  -48.11 
(56.31) 
71.62 
(144.9) 
HHI-IL x For Profit-IL 
  207.77 
(280.34) 
6.86 
(518.71) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Absorption Growth 
 
HHI-IL 
-19.75** 
(8.55) 
-2.49 
(39.54) 
-1.43 
(18.89) 
211.29* 
(118.99) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-IL 
  3.75 
(6.77) 
165.78** 
(69.35) 
HHI-IL x For Profit-IL 
  -30.69 
(35.41) 
-247.34** 
(119.60) 
Number of Observations 231 231 231 231 
 Stabilized Occupancy 
 
HHI-IL 
-.057 
(.059) 
.407** 
(.195) 
-.286* 
(.160) 
.148 
(.464) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-IL 
  -.109** 
(.033) 
.041 
(.154) 
HHI-IL x For Profit-IL 
  .401* 
(.212) 
.314 
(.715) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
*Significant at 10% Level. **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.11: Panel Estimates of MSA Average Monthly Rent, Rent Growth, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, and Stabilized Occupancy for Assisted Living Senior Housing, 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis  
 Log Average Monthly Rent 
Independent Variables  (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
 
HHI-AL 
-.279 
(.374) 
.570*** 
(.119) 
3.71 
(2.57) 
-.918 
(2.44) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-AL 
  -.016 
(.198) 
-.422 
(.276) 
HHI-AL x For Profit-AL 
  -4.50 
(2.94) 
1.78 
(2.82) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Rent Growth 
 
HHI-AL 
-.060* 
(.032) 
-.156 
(.151) 
.281* 
(.149) 
-1.328 
(1.82) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-AL 
  -.009 
(.011) 
-.027 
(.191) 
HHI-AL x For Profit-AL 
  -.385** 
(.168) 
1.384 
(2.22) 
Number of Observations 261 261 261 261 
 Absorption 
 
HHI-AL 
-50.002** 
(22.40) 
-124.65 
(98.95) 
-301.05 
(265.24) 
-1730.65* 
(870.45) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-AL 
  -21.22 
(32.78) 
-164.84 
(131.263) 
HHI-AL x For Profit-AL 
  294.85 
(299.69) 
1897* 
(1010.34) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Absorption Growth 
 
HHI-AL 
35.63* 
(19.57) 
131.38** 
(43.78) 
120.82 
(131.79) 
457.62 
(602.42) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-AL 
  5.011 
(9.545) 
-9.920 
(99.24) 
HHI-AL x For Profit-AL 
  -99.83 
(152.52) 
-383.38 
(706.21) 
Number of Observations 230 230 230 230 
 Stabilized Occupancy 
 
HHI-AL 
-.113 
(.071) 
-.065 
(.051) 
1.55*** 
(.291) 
2.45** 
(.871) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-AL 
  .046* 
(.027) 
.144 
(.119) 
HHI-AL x For Profit-AL 
  -1.90*** 
(.326) 
-2.96** 
(1.02) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.  
*Significant at 10% Level. **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level.  
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Table 3.12: Panel Estimates of MSA Average Monthly Rent, Rent Growth, Absorption, 
Absorption Growth, and Stabilized Occupancy for Nursing Care, Standard Errors in 
Parenthesis  
 Log Average Monthly Rent 
Independent Variables  (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
 
HHI-NC 
-.620 
(.516) 
.897 
(.814) 
-1.19 
(3.02) 
4.86 
(6.40) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-NC 
  -.602** 
(.273) 
1.12 
(.869) 
HHI-NC x For Profit-NC 
  1.31 
(3.51) 
-4.69 
(7.48) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Rent Growth 
 
HHI-NC 
-.029 
(.023) 
.162 
(.173) 
-.009 
(.138) 
-.681 
(.955) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-NC 
  -.001 
(.010) 
-.155 
(.155) 
HHI-NC x For Profit-NC 
  -.022 
(.164) 
1.10 
(1.22) 
Number of Observations 261 261 261 261 
 Absorption 
 
HHI-NC 
306.48** 
(136.62) 
53.58 
(498.85) 
1801** 
(861) 
-117.225 
(4173.58) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-NC 
  110.44* 
(65.98) 
-488.57 
(471.26) 
HHI-NC x For Profit-NC 
  -1869.58* 
(974.31) 
208.51 
(4770.16) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
 Absorption Growth 
 
HHI-NC 
-26.12 
(19.15) 
-8.33 
(261.18) 
-318.16* 
(177.73) 
-286.49 
(1323.169) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-NC 
  -34.33 
(21.63) 
58.88 
(175.36) 
HHI-NC x For Profit-NC 
  376* 
(213.04) 
343.70 
(1469.72) 
Number of Observations 230 230 230 230 
 Stabilized Occupancy 
 
HHI-NC 
-.015 
(.163) 
-.057 
(.132) 
.864 
(.732) 
-2.36* 
(1.29) 
 
Proportion For-Profit-NC 
  -.114* 
(.062) 
-.355 
(.220) 
HHI-NC x For Profit-NC 
  -.910 
(.931) 
2.73* 
(1.46) 
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
*Significant at 10% Level. **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. 
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